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Abstract 
Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program provides benefits to insured workers with disabilities 
under the full retirement age and their dependents based on an individual worker’s earnings and work 
history in covered employment. Recently, some Members of Congress and the public have expressed 
concern over the financial sustainability of the SSDI program. Between 1980 and 2011, the number of 
disabled-worker beneficiaries grew 196.6%, whereas the number of workers insured for disability 
increased 50.9%. This increase in the ratio of disabled-worker beneficiaries to insured workers, or 
prevalence rate, has placed pressure on the Disability Insurance (DI) trust fund, which the Social Security 
Board of Trustees projects will be exhausted in 2016. 
Some of the increase in the SSDI prevalence rate stems from changes in the demographic characteristics 
of the insured-worker population. According to the Social Security Board of Trustees, the aging of the 
baby boom generation and a sharp rise in the number and incidence rate of female insured workers 
helped to propel the prevalence rate upward between 1980 and 2011. However, other factors may have 
also contributed to the growth in SSDI rolls. For example, instances of high unemployment and the 
increasing relative value of SSDI benefits to low-income workers may have induced more individuals to 
apply to the program. In addition, inconsistency in the determination and adjudication process might have 
increased the likelihood of denied claimants being awarded SSDI on appeal. Moreover, changes to federal 
policy that relaxed certain program eligibility criteria and increased the value of disability benefits relative 
to retirement benefits may have played a role in increasing the SSDI prevalence rate. 
To assist lawmakers in addressing the sustainability of the program, this report provides an overview of 
reform proposals designed to mitigate the growth in SSDI rolls. Most of the proposals discussed in this 
report focus on reducing the inflow (incidence) of new beneficiaries into the program. These proposals 
include implementing stricter SSDI eligibility criteria, improving consistency in the disability determination 
and adjudication process, and incentivizing employers to provide supported-work services for employees 
following the onset of disability (i.e., rehabilitation, workplace accommodation, and a partial wage 
replacement). On the other hand, some of the proposals seek to increase the outflow (termination) of 
beneficiaries from the program. Proposals to reduce the current beneficiary population entail providing 
stronger incentives for beneficiaries with some residual functional capacity to return to the labor force, as 
well as increasing the number of continuing disability reviews (CDR) performed by the Social Security 
Administration (SSA). 
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Summary 
Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program provides benefits to insured workers with 
disabilities under the full retirement age and their dependents based on an individual worker’s 
earnings and work history in covered employment. Recently, some Members of Congress and the 
public have expressed concern over the financial sustainability of the SSDI program. Between 
1980 and 2011, the number of disabled-worker beneficiaries grew 196.6%, whereas the number 
of workers insured for disability increased 50.9%. This increase in the ratio of disabled-worker 
beneficiaries to insured workers, or prevalence rate, has placed pressure on the Disability 
Insurance (DI) trust fund, which the Social Security Board of Trustees projects will be exhausted 
in 2016. 
Some of the increase in the SSDI prevalence rate stems from changes in the demographic 
characteristics of the insured-worker population. According to the Social Security Board of 
Trustees, the aging of the baby boom generation and a sharp rise in the number and incidence rate 
of female insured workers helped to propel the prevalence rate upward between 1980 and 2011. 
However, other factors may have also contributed to the growth in SSDI rolls. For example, 
instances of high unemployment and the increasing relative value of SSDI benefits to low-income 
workers may have induced more individuals to apply to the program. In addition, inconsistency in 
the determination and adjudication process might have increased the likelihood of denied 
claimants being awarded SSDI on appeal. Moreover, changes to federal policy that relaxed 
certain program eligibility criteria and increased the value of disability benefits relative to 
retirement benefits may have played a role in increasing the SSDI prevalence rate. 
To assist lawmakers in addressing the sustainability of the program, this report provides an 
overview of reform proposals designed to mitigate the growth in SSDI rolls. Most of the 
proposals discussed in this report focus on reducing the inflow (incidence) of new beneficiaries 
into the program. These proposals include implementing stricter SSDI eligibility criteria, 
improving consistency in the disability determination and adjudication process, and incentivizing 
employers to provide supported-work services for employees following the onset of disability 
(i.e., rehabilitation, workplace accommodation, and a partial wage replacement). On the other 
hand, some of the proposals seek to increase the outflow (termination) of beneficiaries from the 
program. Proposals to reduce the current beneficiary population entail providing stronger 
incentives for beneficiaries with some residual functional capacity to return to the labor force, as 
well as increasing the number of continuing disability reviews (CDR) performed by the Social 
Security Administration (SSA). 
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Introduction 
Concern among some Members of Congress and the public over the financial sustainability of the 
Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program has been growing.1 Between 1980 and 2011, 
the number of disabled-worker beneficiaries in receipt of SSDI rose 196.6% (from approximately 
2.9 million to nearly 8.6 million), whereas the number of workers insured in the event of 
disability increased 50.9% (from almost 100.5 million to more than 151.7 million).2 This increase 
in the ratio of disabled-worker beneficiaries to insured workers, or prevalence rate, has placed 
pressure on the Disability Insurance (DI) trust fund, insofar as inflation-adjusted program 
expenditures have increased 205.5%, from $43.3 billion in 1980 to $132.3 billion in 2011.3 Under 
its intermediate-cost assumptions, the Social Security Board of Trustees estimates that the DI trust 
fund will be exhausted in 2016.4  
To assist lawmakers in addressing the sustainability of the program, this report provides an 
overview of reform proposals designed to mitigate the growth in SSDI rolls. The report is divided 
into four sections. The first section provides a brief background on SSDI, including program 
eligibility criteria, benefits, and the determination and adjudication process. The second section 
discusses the growth in SSDI rolls since 1980 by examining historical entry and exit program 
trends. Drawing upon research from government agencies, academic researchers, and public 
policy organizations, the third section of the report investigates some of the potential factors 
behind the growth in the SSDI prevalence rate, including changes in the demographic and 
economic characteristics of the insured-worker population, inconsistency in the administration of 
the program, and legislative changes to federal policy. The fourth section of the report examines 
various reform proposals to abate the growth in SSDI rolls, namely, stricter eligibility criteria, 
improved program administration, stronger return-to-work incentives, and supported-work 
policies. Although this report discusses potential savings from certain reform proposals, it does 
not specifically examine the effects of the proposals on the solvency of the DI trust fund.5 
                                                 
1 See, for example: U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Social Security, First in a 
Hearing Series on Securing the Future of the Social Security Disability Insurance Program, 112th Cong., 1st sess., 
December 2, 2011, Serial 112–SS11, pp. 4-5, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg76319/pdf/CHRG-
112hhrg76319.pdf. 
2 For beneficiary data, see Social Security Administration, Benefits Awarded by Type of Beneficiary, 
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/ProgData/icp.html. For insured worker data, see Social Security Administration, Disability 
Insured Workers, http://www.ssa.gov/oact/STATS/table4c2DI.html. 
3 Social Security Administration, DI Trust Fund, A Social Security Fund, http://www.ssa.gov/oact/STATS/
table4a2.html. Inflation-adjusted figures computed using the seasonally-unadjusted Consumer Price Index for All 
Urban Consumers (CPI-U) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics at ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt. 
Figures are in 2011 dollars. 
4 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, The 2012 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the 
Federal Old-Age, Survivors Insurance and Federal Disability Insurance Trust Funds, prepared by the Board of 
Trustees, Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Federal Disability Insurance Trust Funds, 112th Cong., 2nd 
sess., April 25, 2012, H.Doc. 112-102 (Washington: GPO, 2012), pp. 2-4, http://www.ssa.gov/oact/TR/2012/
index.html, (hereinafter cited as “2012 Board of Trustees Report”). For more information on trust fund exhaustion, see 
CRS Report RL33514, Social Security: What Would Happen If the Trust Funds Ran Out?, by Christine Scott. 
5 For information on the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) and DI trust funds, see CRS Report RL33028, 
Social Security: The Trust Fund, by Dawn Nuschler and Gary Sidor.  
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Background on SSDI 
Eligibility 
Enacted in 1956 under Title II of the Social Security Act, SSDI is a form of social insurance 
designed to provide protection against the risk of economic loss from the inability to work due to 
a disabling condition or impairment. Administered by the Social Security Administration (SSA), 
SSDI provides benefits to insured workers with disabilities under the full retirement age and their 
dependents (spouses, widow[er]s, and children) based on an individual worker’s earnings and 
work history in covered employment.6 In general, 40 work credits (quarters of coverage) are 
required to qualify for SSDI, 20 of which were earned in the last 10 years ending with the year of 
disability onset.7 However, individuals who become disabled before the age of 31 need fewer 
work credits to qualify for SSDI benefits.8 
To satisfy the disability requirement, an insured worker must be unable to engage in any 
substantial gainful activity (SGA) by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental 
impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted or can be expected to last for 
a continuous period of not less than 12 months.9 For 2013, SSA defines SGA as monthly earnings 
above $1,740 for statutorily blind individuals and $1,040 for non-blind individuals.10 
Benefits 
Cash benefits are based on a worker’s past average monthly earnings, indexed to reflect changes 
in national wage levels (up to five years of the worker’s low earnings are excluded).11 SSA 
annually adjusts benefit levels to account for inflation through Cost-of-Living Adjustments 
(COLA), as measured by the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical 
Workers (CPI-W).12 SSA may offset cash benefits if a disabled worker also receives workers’ 
compensation or other public disability benefits.13 New beneficiaries receive cash benefits after a 
                                                 
6 For more information on the SSDI program, see CRS Report RL32279, Primer on Disability Benefits: Social Security 
Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI), by Umar Moulta-Ali. 
7 20 C.F.R. § 404.130(b). For more information on work history requirements, see Social Security Administration, How 
You Earn Credits, http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/10072.html. In 2013, a worker can receive one credit for each $1,160 of 
earnings, up to the maximum of four credits per year. 
8 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.130(c) and (d). Typically, individuals aged 24 to 30 who become disabled need quarters of 
coverage (work credits) in at least one-half of the quarters during the period ending with that quarter and beginning 
with the quarter after the quarter they became 21 years old. Individuals under the age of 24 generally must have at least 
6 quarters of coverage in the 12-quarter period ending with the quarter in which their disability began.  
9 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). 
10 See Social Security Administration, Substantial Gainful Activity, http://www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/sga.html. 
11 20 C.F.R. § 404.211(e)(3). 
12 20 C.F.R. § 404.272(a)(1). The COLA is measured as the percentage increase in the CPI-W from the third quarter of 
the year in which the last COLA increase became effective to the third quarter of the current year (see 20 C.F.R. § 
404.274[b][ii]). For 2013, a 1.7% COLA was applied to benefits. For more information on COLA increases, see CRS 
Report 94-803, Social Security: Cost-of-Living Adjustments, by Gary Sidor. 
13 20 C.F.R. § 404.408(a)(1)(i). In addition, cash benefits to dependents may be subject to certain maximum family 
benefit limits (see 20 C.F.R. § 404.403). 
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five-month waiting period from the time of disability onset.14 In March 2013, the average 
monthly cash benefit was $1,129.61 for a disabled worker, $302.75 for a spouse of a disabled 
worker, and $336.84 for a child of a disabled worker.15  
In addition to cash benefits, disabled-worker beneficiaries also receive health care coverage under 
Medicare 24 months after program eligibility begins (29 months after the onset of disability).16 
Moreover, SSDI beneficiaries may also meet the eligibility requirements for Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI).17 SSI is a needs-based program that provides cash benefits to ensure a 
minimum income to aged, blind, or disabled individuals with limited income and assets.18 In 
2011, nearly 1.4 million disabled workers and their dependents concurrently received SSDI and 
SSI cash benefits.19  
Determination and Adjudication Process 
To initiate the claims process for SSDI benefits, an insured worker must first file an application 
with SSA either through the agency’s website or by making an appointment at a local SSA field 
office.20 Applications that meet the work history and SGA requirements are then forwarded to a 
Disability Determination Service (DDS). DDSs, which are fully funded by the federal 
government, are state agencies tasked with making disability determinations based on national 
standards established by SSA. During the disability determination process, DDS examiners—with 
the help of medical and psychological consultants—evaluate a claimant’s medical impairment 
against SSA’s Listing of Impairments. If a claimant’s impairment meets (or is of equal severity to) 
the criteria in the listings, SSA considers the claimant to be disabled and therefore eligible for 
SSDI. Claimants who do not meet the medical criteria in the listings proceed to a more 
individualized assessment that examines their residual functional capacity to perform either any 
past relevant work or other work that exists in the national economy. If a claimant cannot perform 
such work, SSA approves his or her application for SSDI. 
                                                 
14 The first month counted as part of the waiting period can be no more than 17 months before the month of application. 
For additional information on the five-month waiting period, see CRS Report RS22220, Social Security Disability 
Insurance (SSDI): The Five-Month Waiting Period for Benefits, by Umar Moulta-Ali. 
15 Social Security Administration, Benefits Awarded by Type of Beneficiary, http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/ProgData/
icp.html. 
16 For more information on Medicare coverage for SSDI beneficiaries, see CRS Report RS22195, Social Security 
Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Medicare: The 24-Month Waiting Period for SSDI Beneficiaries Under Age 65, by 
Scott Szymendera. 
17 For more information on SSI requirements, see CRS Report RL32279, Primer on Disability Benefits: Social Security 
Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI), by Umar Moulta-Ali. 
18 SSA offsets SSI benefits based on receipt of other public benefits, including SSDI cash benefits. For more 
information, see CRS Report RS20294, Supplemental Security Income (SSI): Income/Resource Limits and Accounts 
Exempt from Benefit Determinations, by Umar Moulta-Ali.  
19 Social Security Administration, Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security Disability Insurance Program, 2011, 
2012, Table 65, p. 157, http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/di_asr/2011/index.html (hereinafter cited as “SSDI 
Annual Report 2011”). 
20 Claimants may also apply for SSDI by telephone or mail. For more information on the SSDI determination and 
adjudication process, see CRS Report R41289, Disability Benefits Available Under the Social Security Disability 
Insurance (SSDI) and Veterans Disability Compensation (VDC) Programs, by Umar Moulta-Ali. 
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If a claimant’s application for SSDI benefits is denied at any point during the disability 
determination process, he or she has the right to appeal the decision.21 During the appeals process, 
claimants may present additional evidence or arguments to support their case, as well as appoint a 
representative to act on their behalf.22 The appeals process is composed of four stages: (1) 
reconsideration by a different examiner from the state DDS office, (2) a hearing before an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), (3) a review before the Appeals Council, and (4) filing suit 
against SSA in U.S. district court.23 At each stage of the appeals process, claimants or their 
representatives must request an appeal to the next level, in writing, within 60 days of receiving 
notice of the prior decision. On rare occasions, SSDI cases are appealed beyond U.S. district 
court to the U.S. court of appeals and, ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court.  
Trends in the SSDI Program Since 1980 
Enrollment 
Over the past 30 years, SSA experienced an increase in the number of SSDI applications 
submitted to its offices. Between 1980 and 2011, the annual number of disability applications 
grew 123.1% (from nearly 1.3 million to almost 2.9 million).24 As Figure 1 illustrates, most of 
the growth in SSDI applications began in 2000. From 1980 to 1999, the annual number of 
applications received by SSA remained roughly constant, averaging about 1.1 million between 
1980 and 1989, and 1.3 million from 1990 to 1999; however, between 2000 and 2009, the 
average annual number of applications for disability rose to more than 2.0 million. 
As with applications, the number of awards for disability increased as well. Between 1980 and 
2011, the annual number of SSDI awards granted by SSA grew 137.9% (from over 420,300 to 
more than 1.0 million). However, unlike applications, awards increased at a somewhat steadier 
rate, averaging 408,300 between 1980 and 1989; 601,100 from 1990 to 1999; and 796,200 
between 2000 and 2009. Awards as a percentage of applications for SSDI increased from 33.3% 
in 1980 to 52.0% in 1998, before declining to 35.4% in 2011.25  
SSDI awards per 1,000 insured workers rose 58.1% during this period (from 4.3 in 1980 to 6.8 in 
2011). Insured workers are individuals who meet the work-history requirements for disability 
                                                 
21 42 U.S.C. § 405. 
22 20 C.F.R. § 404.1700. Claimants may be represented by either an attorney or non-attorney during the appeals process 
(as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1705).  
23 See SSDI Annual Report 2011, p. 4. In 1999, SSA eliminated the reconsideration step in 10 States, as part of the 
Disability Redesign Prototype (Prototype) initiative, which included Alaska, Alabama, California (Los Angeles West 
and North Branches), Colorado, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, New Hampshire, New York, and Pennsylvania. 
Although SSA expected the initiative to result in earlier decisions and shorter wait-times for claimants, the opposite has 
been true. In fiscal year (FY) 2011, SSA reinstated the reconsideration step in the state of Michigan and is evaluating 
potential reinstatements in Colorado and other states. For more information, see CRS Report R41289, Disability 
Benefits Available Under the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Veterans Disability Compensation (VDC) 
Programs, by Umar Moulta-Ali. 
24 Social Security Administration, Annual Statistical Supplement to the Social Security Bulletin, 2012, February 2013, 
Table 6.C7, http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/2012/6c.html (hereinafter cited as “SSA Annual 
Statistical Supplement 2012”). 
25 SSA typically measures the award rate by dividing awards by all applications minus pending claims. For more 
information on the award rate, see SSDI Annual Report 2011, Table 59, pp. 142-143. 
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benefits. The number of awards per 1,000 insured workers is a rough estimate of the enrollment 
(incidence) rate of disabled-worker beneficiaries in the SSDI program.26 
Figure 1. SSDI Applications and Awards 
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Source: Social Security Administration, Annual Statistical Supplement to the Social Security Bulletin, 2012, February 
2013, Table 6.C7. 
Notes: Applications and Awards are in thousands (left axis).The measure “awards per 1,000 insured workers” is 
in single digits (right axis). Insured workers are individuals who meet the work-history requirements for SSDI 
benefits. 
Terminations 
In general, SSA continues to pay benefits to SSDI recipients as long as they are disabled, 
ineligible for OASI retirement benefits, and have monthly earnings at or below the SGA 
threshold. However, when SSA determines that beneficiaries no longer meet SSDI’s eligibility 
criteria, the agency will remove them from the program and terminate their cash and medical 
benefits.27 Although the overall number of disabled-worker terminations increased 44.4% 
between 1980 and 2009 (from 434,637 to 627,648), the ratio of disabled-worker terminations to 
insured workers (hereinafter “termination rate”) actually decreased 45.3% (from 145.4 to 79.5 
disabled-worker terminations per 1,000 insured workers). 28  
                                                 
26 The Social Security Board of Trustees measures the disability enrollment (incidence) rate as “the ratio of the number 
of new beneficiaries awarded benefits each year to the number of individuals who meet insured requirements but are 
not yet receiving benefits (the disability-exposed population).” For more information on the incidence rate, see 2012 
Board of Trustees Report, p. 125. 
27 Recipients whose cash benefits were terminated due to earnings above SGA may still be eligible for up to 93 months 
of premium-free Medicare Part A (Hospital Insurance) following a Trial Work Period (TWP). See SSDI Annual Report 
2011, p. 6. For more information on return-to-work incentives and TWP, see the subsection of the report entitled 
“Return-to-Work Incentives.” 
28 Tim Zayatz, Social Security Disability Insurance Program Workers Experience: Actuarial Study No. 114, Social 
Security Administration, 1999, Table 5, and subsequent editions, http://www.ssa.gov/oact/NOTES/actstud.html. 
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As depicted in Figure 2, three main factors drive the termination rate: death, conversion, and 
recovery. The beneficiary death rate decreased 40.2% between 1980 and 2009 (from 47.8 to 
nearly 28.6 disabled-worker terminations per 1,000 insured workers), reflecting the trend in the 
U.S. population of declining mortality rates across all age groups.29 Between 1980 and 2009, the 
conversion rate fell 36.9% (from 68.1 to almost 43.0 disabled-worker terminations per 1,000 
insured workers). A conversion termination occurs when SSA automatically converts a disabled-
worker benefit to a retired-worker benefit under the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) 
program due to a disabled worker reaching full retirement age (FRA). FRA is the age at which 
unreduced retirement benefits are first payable.30 From 1980 to 2009, the recovery rate declined 
79.6% (from 28.5 to about 5.8 disabled-worker terminations per 1,000 insured workers). 
Recovery refers to individuals removed from SSDI because they no longer meet SSA’s definition 
of disability due either to a medical improvement or demonstrable ability to engage in SGA. 
Figure 2. SSDI Disabled-Worker Termination Rates 
By Type (1980-2009) 
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Source: Tim Zayatz, Social Security Disability Insurance Program Workers Experience: Actuarial Study No. 114, Social 
Security Administration, 1999, Table 5, and subsequent editions. 
Notes: Data from 1980 to 1985 compiled from Actuarial Study No. 114, while data from 1986 to 2009 
compiled from Actuarial Study No. 122. 
The rise in the recovery rate during the early 1980s stemmed mainly from the enactment of the 
Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980 (P.L. 96-265), which expanded the use of 
continuing disability reviews (CDR) for all non-permanently disabled beneficiaries.31 CDRs are 
periodic medical reevaluations to determine whether disabled beneficiaries continue to meet 
                                                 
29 Donna L. Hoyert, 75 Years of Mortality in the United States, 1935–2010, Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention: National Center for Health Statistics, 2012, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db88.htm. 
30 FRA is currently 66; however, FRA will reach 67 for workers born in 1960 or later. For more information on FRA, 
see CRS Report R42035, Social Security Primer, by Dawn Nuschler. 
31 For more information on the Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980, see John R. Kearney, “Social Security 
and the “D” in OASDI: The History of a Federal Program Insuring Earners Against Disability,” Social Security 
Bulletin, vol. 66 no. 3 (August 2006), http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v66n3/v66n3p1.html (hereinafter cited as 
“Kearney 2006”).  
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SSA’s definition of disability.32 A major review of the SSDI program after the passage of the 1980 
amendments resulted in a significant increase in the recovery rate between 1980 and 1982.33 
However, the political backlash over the implementation of the reviews led to a 1983 temporary 
moratorium on CDRs for most mental impairment cases and an increase in the percentage of 
beneficiaries designated as permanently disabled and therefore subject to less frequent reviews.34 
Consequently, the recovery rate fell below its 1980 level.35 
The 1997 increase in the recovery rate largely resulted from the passage of the Contract with 
America Advancement Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-121), which terminated the benefits of SSDI and 
SSI recipients whose drug addiction and alcoholism (DA&A) significantly contributed to their 
disability.36 However, since DA&A beneficiaries represented only around 2.6% of all disabled 
adults on SSDI and SSI in 1996 and new applicants could no longer claim disability based on 
DA&A, P.L. 104-121’s impact on the overall trend in the SSDI recovery rate was minimal.37 
Starting in 2002, the recovery rate contracted again, in part because of a reduction in the number 
of medical CDRs performed by SSA. The Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996 
authorized additional funds for CDRs but only for fiscal year (FY) 1996 through FY2002.38 In 
FY2003, the additional funding for CDRs lapsed and SSA shifted its focus away from CDRs 
toward processing the growing number of initial disability claims.39 As a result, the number of 
medical CDRs performed by SSA dropped from an all-time high of 876,802 in FY2000 to 
207,637 in FY2007, before climbing back up to 443,233 in FY2012.40 
                                                 
32 Non-permanently disabled beneficiaries with a reasonable chance of recovery receive a CDR every three years. 
Disabled beneficiaries with a high probability of medical improvement typically receive a CDR at intervals between 6 
months and 18 months following their most recent decision. Disabled beneficiaries with a low probability of medical 
improvement (permanently disabled) receive CDRs less frequently, generally at intervals determined by the Social 
Security Commissioner (normally every five to seven years). For more information, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1590. 
33 According to SSA officials, the rise in the termination rate during the early 1980s is not entirely attributable to the 
accelerated use of CDRs. An initiative begun in 1981 by SSA aggressively targeted beneficiaries whom the agency 
believed were unlikely to have a disability or impairment, despite being on the rolls. This initiative, coupled with the 
increased use of CDRs, resulted in an increase in the recovery rate for SSDI beneficiaries in the early 1980s. For more 
information, see U.S. Government Accountability Office, Social Security Disability Programs: Clearer Guidance 
Could Help SSA Apply the Medical Improvement Standard More Consistently, GAO-07-8, October 3, 2006, p. 6, “The 
Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984”, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-8. 
34 Kearney 2006, p. 16. 
35 The Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984 enshrined some of the 1983 reforms into law. For more information on 
how the 1984 amendments affected program participation, see the subsection of the report entitled “The Disability 
Benefits Reform Act of 1984.” 
36 The act stopped awarding benefits to DA&A claimants on the day of enactment, March 29, 1996. DA&A 
beneficiaries who appealed the termination continued to receive benefits while they waited for a decision. For more 
information, see Paul Davies, Howard Iams, and Kalman Rupp, “The Effect of Welfare Reform on The SSA’s 
Disability Programs: Design of Policy Evaluation and Early Evidence,” Social Security Bulletin, vol. 63 no. 1 (July 
2000), p. 4, http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v63n1/index.html. 
37 Ibid., p. 6. 
38 42 U.S.C. § 401(g)(1)(A). 
39 Social Security Administration, Social Security Administration, Performance and Accountability Report, Fiscal Year 
2003, November 10, 2003, and subsequent editions, http://www.ssa.gov/finance/. 
40 FY2000 data is from the Social Security Advisory Board, Aspects of Disability Decision Making: Data and 
Materials, February 2012, Table 13, p. 18, http://www.ssab.gov/PublicationViewOptions.aspx?ssab_pub=115, while 
FY2007 and FY2012 data is from the Social Security Administration, Social Security Administration, Performance and 
Accountability Report, Fiscal Year 2012, November 8, 2012, p. 80, http://www.ssa.gov/finance/. 
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Program Size 
Between 1980 and 2011, the overall number of disabled-worker beneficiaries and their 
dependents increased 125.5% (from about 4.7 million to more than 10.6 million).41 Most of the 
growth in the program stemmed from disabled-worker beneficiaries, whose ranks rose from 
around 2.9 million to almost 8.6 million—an increase of 196.6% (Figure 3). Conversely, the 
number of spouses of disabled workers on SSDI decreased 64.5% during this period (from almost 
461,900 to more than 164,000). The number of children of disabled workers receiving benefits 
expanded rather modestly compared with disabled workers, increasing 35.7% (from nearly 1.4 
million in 1980 to roughly 1.9 million in 2011). 
Figure 3. SSDI Disabled-Worker Beneficiaries and Their Dependents 
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Source: Computed from the Social Security Administration, Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security 
Disability Insurance Program, 2011, Table 1, p. 17. 
Notes: The category “Children” includes dependent children under the age of 18, dependent student children 
between the ages of 18 and 19, as well as disabled adult children of disabled workers. Disabled adult children can 
receive benefits at age 18 or older if they are unmarried and the disability began before age 22. To qualify for 
spousal benefits, the spouse of a disabled worker must either have a child under the age of 16 or a disabled child 
in his or her care or be at least 62 years of age. Disabled widow(er)s and disabled adult children of retired or 
deceased workers are not included in the graph above because payments for their benefits are made from the 
OASI trust fund. 
The size of the SSDI program is largely the function of two main factors: the incidence 
(enrollment) rate of beneficiaries in the program and the termination rate of beneficiaries from the 
program.42 From 1980 to 2011, a marked rise in the incidence rate, coupled with a steady decline 
                                                 
41 SSDI Annual Report 2011, Table 1, p. 17. 
42 In addition to the incidence and termination rates, the size of the SSDI program is determined by a third factor: the 
duration of benefit receipt. A beneficiary’s length of stay on SSDI is primarily a function of his or her age and 
diagnosis. Duration of benefit receipt is discussed in the “The Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984” subsection of 
the report. For more information on the determinants to program size, see Social Security Administration, Trends in the 
Social Security and Supplemental Security Income Disability Programs, SSA Publication No. 13-11831, August 2006, 
p. 37, http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/chartbooks/disability_trends/index.html (hereinafter cited as “SSA, Trends in 
(continued...) 
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in the termination rate, resulted in an appreciable increase in the number of beneficiaries on 
SSDI. The prevalence rate measures the total number of disabled-worker beneficiaries relative to 
the overall insured-worker population in a given year. Between 1980 and 2011, the gross 
(unadjusted) prevalence rate grew 103.6% (from 28 to 57 disabled-worker beneficiaries per 1,000 
insured workers; Figure 4).43 With the increase in the gross prevalence rate, the fraction of the 
working-age resident population (aged 18-64) receiving SSDI benefits rose from 2.1% in 1980 to 
4.6% in 2011.44 
Figure 4. SSDI Disabled-Worker Prevalence Rates 
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Source: The Social Security Board of Trustees, The 2012 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-
Age and Survivors Insurance and Federal Disability Insurance Trust Funds, Table V.C5, p. 131. 
Notes: The age-sex-adjusted rate is set to the age-sex distribution of the insured-worker population in the year 
2000. 
When one adjusts the prevalence rate to control for the effects of changes in the age-sex 
distribution of the insured-worker population over time, the upward trend remains conspicuous, 
albeit somewhat less pronounced. Age-sex adjusting permits a more “meaningful comparison” 
over extended periods, insofar as it “isolates the changing trend in the true likelihood of receiving 
benefits for the insured population, without reflecting changes in the age distribution of the 
population.” 45 From 1980 to 2011, the age-sex-adjusted prevalence rate grew 45.2% (from 31 to 
45 disabled-worker beneficiaries per 1,000 insured workers). 
                                                                 
(...continued) 
SSDI 2006”. 
43 2012 Board of Trustees Report, Table V.C5, p. 131. 
44 1980 data is from the U.S. General Accounting Office (now called U.S. Government Accountability Office), Social 
Security Disability Rolls Keep Growing, While Explanations Remain Elusive, HEHS-94-34, February 1994, p. 3, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/HEHS-94-34 (hereinafter cited as “GAO, Disability Rolls Keep Growing 1994”), while 
2011 data is from SSDI Annual Report 2011, Table 8, p. 29. 
45 2012 Board of Trustees Report, p.134.  
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Factors Behind the Growth in SSDI Rolls 
Some disagree over the primary drivers behind the increase in the ratio of disabled-worker 
beneficiaries to insured workers. The growing gap between the gross and age-sex-adjusted 
prevalence rates suggests that changes in the age-sex distribution of the insured-worker 
population have contributed to the increase in the SSDI prevalence rate over time (Figure 4). 
However, the increase in the age-sex-adjusted prevalence rate indicates that the growth in SSDI 
rolls is not entirely attributable to changes in the age-sex distribution of the population. Changes 
in the economic incentives to apply for SSDI, inconsistency in the administration of the program, 
and legislative changes to federal policy may have also helped to increase the prevalence of SSDI 
receipt among the insured-worker population. This section examines some of the more salient 
explanations for the rise in SSDI rolls, as well as discusses other potential factors. 
Changes in the Demographic Characteristics of Insured Workers 
Part of the reason why SSDI rolls have 
expanded stems from the growth in the size of 
the insured-worker population.46 Between 
1980 and 2010, the U.S. working-age 
population (aged 18-64) increased 41.6% 
(from more than 137.2 million to almost 194.3 
million), whereas the number of workers 
insured in the event of disability grew 49.8% 
(from nearly 100.5 million to around 150.5 
million).47 The combination of an increase in 
the number of insured workers due to 
population growth and a rise in the percentage 
of the working-age population insured for 
disability resulted in an expansion in the size 
of the insured-worker population.48 In addition, the rise in the incidence of benefit receipt among 
the disability-exposed population has played a role in exacerbating the growth in SSDI rolls. 
From 1980 to 2009, the gross incidence (enrollment) rate grew 56.8% (from 4.4 to 6.9 awards per 
1,000 disability-exposed workers).49 The following subsection investigates how changes in the 
                                                 
46 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Social Security, Johnson Announces 
Hearing on the Financing Challenges Facing the Social Security Disability Insurance Program , Testimony of Stephen 
C. Goss, Chief Actuary of the Social Security Administration, 113th Cong., 1st sess., March 14, 2013, p. 4, 
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/goss_testimony.pdf (hereinafter cited as “Testimony of Stephen C. Goss 
2013”). 
47 The 1980 working-age population data is from GAO, Disability Rolls Keep Growing 1994, p. 3, while 2010 
working-age population data is from the U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Estimates of the Resident Population by Sex and 
Selected Age Groups for the United States: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2011, NC-EST2011-02, http://www.census.gov/
popest/data/national/asrh/2011/index.html. Insured worker data computed from the Social Security Administration, 
Disability Insured Workers, http://www.ssa.gov/oact/STATS/table4c2DI.html. 
48 Testimony of Stephen C. Goss, 2013, p. 4. According to the Chief Actuary, the growth in the share of the population 
insured for disability between 1980 and 2010 increased the number of disabled-worker beneficiaries by 8%. 
49 Tim Zayatz, Social Security Disability Insurance Program Workers Experience: Actuarial Study No. 114, Social 
Security Administration, 1999, Table 4, and subsequent editions, http://www.ssa.gov/oact/NOTES/actstud.html. The 
disability-exposed population excludes insured workers who receive SSDI benefits, whereas the insured-worker 
population measure includes them. For more information, see 2012 Board of Trustees Report, p. 125. 
Helpful Definitions 
Insured-Worker Population: The total number of 
workers who meet the work-history requirements for 
disability benefits 
Prevalence Rate: The ratio of the number of disabled-
worker beneficiaries in current-payment status each year 
to the insured-worker population  
Disability-Exposed Population: The total number of 
workers who meet insured requirements but are not yet 
receiving benefits 
Incidence Rate: The ratio of the number of new 
beneficiaries awarded benefits each year to the disability-
exposed population  
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demographic characteristics of the population may have increased both the size and incidence rate 
of the insured-worker population, thereby enlarging disability rolls. 
A Sharp Rise in the Number and Incidence Rate of Female Insured Workers 
The latter half of the 20th century witnessed a marked expansion of women in the labor force. 
Between 1950 and 1999, the labor force participation rate for women aged 16 and older nearly 
doubled (from 33.8% to an all-time high of 60.0%).50 The higher participation rate afforded more 
women the opportunity to earn enough quarters of coverage to qualify for disability insurance. 
From 1980 to 2010, the number of female workers insured for disability rose 79.9% (from almost 
40.2 million to more than 72.3 million).51 Whereas the share of working-age men (aged 15-64) 
insured for disability declined during this period from 77% to 74%, the portion of working-age 
women insured for disability increased from 51% to 68%.52  
The growth in the size of the female insured-worker population coincided with a rapid rise in the 
incidence rate of women in the SSDI program. Whereas the age-adjusted incidence rate for men 
entering the SSDI program increased 22.0% between 1986 and 2009 (from 5.0 to 6.1 awards per 
1,000 disability-exposed male workers), the age-adjusted incidence rate for women rose 68.6% 
(from 3.5 to 5.9 awards per 1,000 disability-exposed female workers).53 According to the Social 
Security Board of Trustees, the increase in the incidence of benefit receipt among female insured 
workers helped propel the age-sex-adjusted prevalence rate upward.54 However, SSA’s Chief 
Actuary projects that both male and female age-adjusted incidence rates should stabilize between 
five and six awards per 1,000 disability-exposed workers in the future.55 
A Shift in the Age Distribution of Inured Workers 
In addition to the rise in women’s labor force participation, the aging of the large baby boom 
generation—individuals born between 1946 and 1964—also contributed to the increase in SSDI 
rolls.56 Beginning in 1996, working-age baby boomers increasingly entered their most disability-
prone years (aged 50 to full retirement age [FRA]), thereby shifting the age distribution of the 
insured-worker population from younger workers (aged 25 to 44) to older workers (aged 45 to 
FRA).57  
                                                 
50 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/
LNS11300002. The labor force participation rate for women has since fallen to 57.1% as of March 2013. 
51 Social Security Advisory Board, Aspects of Disability Decision Making: Data and Materials, February 2012, Table 
2a, p. 7, http://www.ssab.gov/PublicationViewOptions.aspx?ssab_pub=115 (hereinafter cited as “SSAB Data and 
Materials 2012”). 
52 Ibid., Table 2b. 
53 Tim Zayatz, Social Security Disability Insurance Program Workers Experience: Actuarial Study No. 122, Social 
Security Administration, 2011, Table 4, http://www.ssa.gov/oact/NOTES/actstud.html. Age adjustment computed using 
the age distribution of the disability-exposed population in the year 2000. 
54 2012 Board of Trustees Report, p.133. 
55 Testimony of Stephen C. Goss 2013, pp. 7-8. 
56 2012 Board of Trustees Report, p.133-134. See also Xuguang (Steve) Guo and John F. Burton, Jr., “The Growth in 
Applications for Social Security Disability Insurance: A Spillover Effect from Workers’ Compensation,” Social 
Security Bulletin, vol. 72 no. 3, (August 2012), http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v72n3/v72n3p69.html (hereinafter 
cited as “Guo and Burton, Jr. 2012”). 
57 Congressional Budget Office, Policy Options for the Social Security Disability Insurance Program, 4207, July 2012, 
(continued...) 
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The shift from younger to older insured workers helped to increase the gross incidence and 
prevalence rates, inasmuch as older workers have a higher likelihood of benefit receipt relative to 
younger workers.58 In making a disability determination, DDS examiners take into account the 
claimant’s medical condition, as well as vocational factors such as age, education, and work 
experience. Since eligibility criteria typically become less stringent with age, SSA is more likely 
to award benefits to older insured workers compared to younger workers.59 Between 1986 and 
2009, the portion of SSDI benefits awarded to younger insured workers (aged 25-44) decreased 
from 30.0% to 22.0%, whereas the share of benefits awarded to older workers (aged 45 to FRA) 
increased from 66.7% to 75.5%.60 However, the Social Security Board of Trustees expects the 
gross prevalence rate to grow more slowly in the future as baby boomers increasingly become 
eligible for full OASI retirement benefits.61 
Slightly Higher Work-Limiting Disability Rates 
Changing trends in the health status of the U.S. population may have also helped to enlarge SSDI 
rolls. Over the past 40 years, advances in medical care and technology significantly reduced the 
death rate in the United States.62 Between 1970 and 2010, the crude (unadjusted) mortality rate 
fell 15.4 % (from 945.3 to 799.5 deaths per 100,000 population).63 When one controls for the 
effects of the aging U.S. population, the reduction in mortality is even more pronounced. From 
1970 to 2010, the age-adjusted mortality rate declined 38.9% (from 1,222.6 to 747.0 deaths per 
100,000 population).64  
The decreased likelihood of dying in a given year helped to increase the chance of an individual 
surviving to his or her most disability-prone years (aged 50 to FRA). One study found that only 
68% of males born in 1921 survived to the age of 60 compared with 78% of males born in 1941.65 
The increased likelihood of surviving to their most disability-prone years may have lowered the 
overall health of the insured-worker population, consequently raising the incidence of benefit 
receipt. According to data from the Current Population Survey (CPS), the share of men and 
                                                                 
(...continued) 
p. 7, http://www.cbo.gov/publication/43421 (hereinafter cited as “CBO, Policy Options 2012”). For insured worker 
data, see Social Security Administration, Disability Insured Workers, http://www.ssa.gov/oact/STATS/
table4c2DI.html. See also Mark Duggan and Scott A. Imberman, “Why Are the Disability Rolls Skyrocketing? The 
Contribution of Population Characteristics, Economic Conditions, and Program Generosity,” in Health at Older Ages: 
The Causes and Consequences of Declining Disability among the Elderly , ed. David M. Cutler and David A. Wise, 
National Bureau of Economic Research (University of Chicago Press, 2009), pp. 342-345, http://www.nber.org/
chapters/c11119 (hereinafter cited as “Duggan and Imberman 2009”).  
58 2012 Board of Trustees Report, pp.125-134. See also CBO, Policy Options 2012, p. 7. 
59 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563. For more information on vocational factors, please see Appendix 2 to Subpart P of Part 
404 - Medical-Vocational Guidelines in 20 C.F.R. § 404.  
60 Tim Zayatz, Social Security Disability Insurance Program Worker Experience: Actuarial Study No. 122, Social 
Security Administration, 2011, Table 3, http://www.ssa.gov/oact/NOTES/actstud.html. The share of benefits awarded 
to workers aged 15 to 24 decreased as well, from 3.3% in 1986 to 2.5% in 2009. 
61 2012 Board of Trustees Report, pp.133-134. 
62 David R. Francis, Why do Death Rates Decline?, National Bureau of Economic Research, http://www.nber.org/
digest/mar02/w8556.html. 
63 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Deaths: Final Data for 2010, Table 1, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/
dvs/deaths_2010_release.pdf. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Duggan and Imberman 2009, p. 349. 
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women aged 21-64 reporting a work limitation due to a disability rose from 7.9% in 1981 to 8.5% 
in 2011.66 However, some researchers contend that the health of individuals in their most 
disability-prone years has actually improved since 1980.67 In fact, one study concluded that the 
improved health of individuals aged 50-64 might have slowed the growth in SSDI rolls between 
1984 and 2002.68 
Part of the problem in determining the trend in the prevalence of work-limiting disabilities in the 
U.S. population stems from the fact that there is no single, universally accepted definition or 
measure of disability.69 Although many of the large demographic surveys used by researchers and 
the federal government specifically ask questions pertaining to work-limiting disabilities, the 
wording and complexity of the questions often differs. Moreover, because surveys are self-
reporting, the definition of what constitutes a work-limiting disability often rests entirely on the 
subjectivity of the respondent. That said, given the relatively small increase in the CPS measured 
disability prevalence rate, it seems unlikely that the change in the prevalence of work-limiting 
disabilities in the U.S. population can adequately explain the growth in SSDI rolls. 
Changes in the Economic Incentives to Apply for SSDI 
The decision to apply for SSDI may be influenced not only by health status but also by economic 
opportunities. The relative value of SSDI cash and medical benefits may induce individuals with 
limited income and assets to apply to the program. Although the initial determination process 
screens out most non-meritorious claimants, SSA may grant awards to some claimants on the 
margin of program entry who could potentially work but choose not to due to economic 
circumstances. This subsection outlines how changes in the economic incentives to apply for 
SSDI may have increased the incidence of benefit receipt and thus expanded disability rolls. 
A Rise in the Unemployment Rate 
During periods of strong economic growth, individuals who qualify for SSDI might forgo 
applying for benefits and decide to seek or continue employment. However, when adverse shocks 
to the national economy reduce growth and increase unemployment, individuals who might 
otherwise choose to work may instead apply for SSDI benefits as a form of unemployment 
assistance. An extensive body of literature has empirically found a positive relationship between 
the unemployment rate and SSDI application rate.70 With the exception of the period between 
                                                 
66 Nazarov, Z, Lee, C. G. (2012). Disability Statistics from the Current Population Survey (CPS). Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Rehabilitation Research and Training Center on Disability Demographics and Statistics (StatsRRTC). 
Retrieved February 21, 2013 from www.disabilitystatistics.org. The margin of error for both years is ± 0.2.  
67 David Autor and Mark Duggan, The Growth in the Social Security Disability Rolls: A Fiscal Crisis Unfolding, 
National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper no.12436, August 2006, p. 17, http://www.nber.org/papers/
w12436 (hereinafter cited as “Autor and Duggan 2006”). See also Duggan and Imberman 2009. 
68 Duggan and Imberman 2009, p. 354 
69 Disability Statistics, Frequently Asked Questions: What is the definition of disability?, Maintained by Cornell 
University, 2013, http://www.disabilitystatistics.org/faq.cfm#Q3. See also SSA, Trends in SSDI 2006, p. 68. 
70 See Kalman Rupp and David Stapleton, Determinants of the Growth in the Social Security’s Administration’s 
Disability Programs: An Overview, Social Security Administration, vol. 58, no. 4, 1995, http://www.ssa.gov/policy/
docs/ssb/v58n4/v58n4p43.pdf (hereinafter cited as “Rupp and Stapleton 1995”). See also David H. Autor and Mark G. 
Duggan, “The Rise in the Disability Rolls and the Decline in Unemployment,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
February 2003, pp. 158-205. In addition, see Guo and Burton, Jr. 2012, p. 78. 
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1980 and 1984, instances of high unemployment are associated with an increase in SSDI 
applications. As Figure 5 illustrates, the recent recession (December 2007 to June 2009) 
contributed to a conspicuous spike in the number of SSDI applications submitted to SSA; 
between 2007 and 2009, SSDI applications increased 27.3% (from almost 2.2 million to more 
than 2.8 million).71 
Figure 5. SSDI Applications and Awards During Instances of High Unemployment 
January 1980 – December 2011 
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Source: Application and Award data compiled from the Social Security Administration, Annual Statistical 
Supplement to the Social Security Bulletin, 2012, February 2013, Table 6.C7. Unemployment data is from the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics (BLS). Recession data is from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). 
Notes: Applications and Awards are in thousands (left axis). The unemployment rate (right axis) is the number 
of all unemployed individuals aged 16 and older as a percentage of the civilian non-institutionalized labor force. 
BLS considers individuals to be unemployed if they do not have a job, have actively looked for work in the past 
four weeks, and are currently available for work. Shaded areas indicate a recession. NBER defines recession as a 
“significant decline in economic activity spread across the economy, lasting more than a few months, normally 
visible in real Gross Domestic Product (GDP), real income, employment, industrial production, and wholesale-
retail sales.” 
The relationship between the unemployment rate and the number of SSDI awards granted by SSA 
is somewhat more ambiguous, inasmuch as the award year may not coincide with the application 
year due to a prolonged determination or appeals process.72 Moreover, one study found that a 
claimant’s likelihood of receiving an award at the initial determination level decreases as the 
                                                 
71 SSA Annual Statistical Supplement 2012, Table 6.C7. Although there is no official definition of recession, federal 
agencies such as the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) generally use the definition of recession outlined by the 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)—a private, non-profit research organization. NBER does not use the 
often-cited definition of recession as two consecutive quarters of decline in real Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 
Instead, the organization defines recession as a “significant decline in economic activity spread across the economy, 
lasting more than a few months, normally visible in real GDP, real income, employment, industrial production, and 
wholesale-retail sales.” For more information, see the National Bureau of Economic Research, US Business Cycle 
Expansions and Contractions, http://www.nber.org/cycles.html. 
72 Duggan and Imberman 2009 p. 355 
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unemployment rate rises.73 Nevertheless, the overall number of SSDI awards issued by SSA does 
appear to increase during instances of high unemployment, albeit to a lesser extent relative to the 
number of SSDI applications.74 Between 2007 and 2009, the number of SSDI awards granted by 
SSA increased 20.3% (from 818,500 to 984,500).75  
An Increase in the Relative Replacement Wage 
In addition to changes in the business cycle, the value of cash benefits relative to potential 
earnings may also affect a worker’s decision to apply for SSDI. Disability insurance protects 
workers against the risk of economic loss from the inability to work due to a disabling condition 
or impairment by providing a partial replacement wage (cash benefits). Although SSA bases the 
value of the replacement wage on a worker’s past nominal earnings, the agency also indexes or 
adjusts the replacement wage to reflect changes in the average national wage level over time, as 
measured by the Average Wage Index (AWI). 76 As a result, a high relative replacement wage may 
encourage workers who have the ability to obtain some form of employment not to work and 
apply for SSDI instead.77  
The influence of the relative replacement wage on an individual’s decision to apply for SSDI may 
especially affect low-income workers, to the extent that said workers have experienced slower 
real income growth relative to medium and high-wage earners since 1980. Whereas the real 
earnings of low-income workers (10th percentile) grew 12% between 1980 and 2004, the real 
earnings of medium-income workers (50th percentile) and high-income workers (90th percentile) 
increased 15% and 36%, respectively.78 The widening distribution of income during this period 
helped to expand the national AWI, thereby increasing the value of the indexed replacement wage 
for low-income workers relative to their slower growing real earnings.79  
The combination of sluggish real wage growth and rising replacement rates may have impelled 
low-income workers to apply for SSDI as a means of enhancing their annual compensation. One 
study found that the “wage gap” between low-skilled workers with only a high school degree and 
workers with additional education accounted for 68.4% of the variation in SSDI applications 
                                                 
73 Kalman Rupp, “Factors Affecting Initial Disability Allowance Rates for the Disability Insurance and Supplemental 
Security Income Programs: The Role of the Demographic and Diagnostic Composition of Applicants and Local Labor 
Market Conditions,” Social Security Bulletin, vol. 72 no. 4, (November 2012), p. 32, http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/
ssb/v72n4/v72n4p11.html. Rupp found that an increase in the state unemployment rate is associated with a decrease in 
the initial allowance rate. The allowance rate is the number of medical allowances divided by the number of medical 
decisions. Unlike the award rate (awards divided by applications minus pending claims), the allowance rate does not 
include technical denials at the initial determination level. Technical denials are issued when a claimant fails to meet 
the non-disability eligibility requirements (i.e., work history and earnings). 
74 Rupp and Stapleton 1995, p. 56 
75 SSA Annual Statistical Supplement 2012, Table 6.C7. 
76 For more information on how benefits are calculated, see CRS Report R42035, Social Security Primer, by Dawn 
Nuschler.  
77 For more information, see L. Scott Muller, “The Effects of Wage Indexing on Social Security Disability Benefits,” 
Social Security Bulletin, vol. 68 no. 3, (December 2008), p. 25, http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v68n3/
v68n3p1.html (hereinafter cited as “Muller 2008”). 
78 CRS Report RL34155, Income Inequality and the U.S. Tax System, by Thomas L. Hungerford. 
79 See Autor and Duggan 2006, Table 2. See also Muller 2008, Table 1.  
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between 1978 and 2008.80 However, researchers are divided over the extent to which rising 
replacement wage rates induce low-income workers to apply for SSDI benefits.81  
The Value of Health Care Benefits 
Access to health care could also affect an individual’s decision to apply for SSDI. Over the years, 
the cost of health insurance has grown considerably. Between 1999 and 2010, the average annual 
total premium (employer and employee) for family coverage rose 137.8% (from $5,791 to 
$13,770).82 The marked increase in the cost of premiums has made it exceedingly difficult for 
many individuals and employers to continue paying for health insurance. From 1999 to 2010, the 
share of the population covered by private health insurance declined from 73.0% to 64.0%.83 
Because of the high cost of treating and managing chronic or severe medical conditions on their 
own, individuals with disabilities who lack health insurance may apply for SSDI in order to 
qualify for Medicare. Therefore, the rising cost of private medical insurance might have played a 
role in driving up the SSDI prevalence rate.84  
However, the recently enacted Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148, as 
amended) could help to reduce the number of individuals who apply for SSDI in order to qualify 
for Medicare in the future. ACA is designed to increase access to affordable health insurance for 
individuals without coverage and make health insurance more affordable for those already 
covered.85 To expand the availability of affordable health insurance, ACA requires the 
establishment of state-based insurance exchanges for the purchase of health insurance and sets 
federal minimum requirements for the private health insurance market. Moreover, the act 
provides federal subsidies to certain individuals and families to reduce the cost of purchasing 
health insurance coverage, as well as expands eligibility for Medicaid. By making health 
insurance more affordable for individuals without coverage, ACA may reduce the incentives to 
                                                 
80 Dana A. Kerr and Bert J. Smoluk, “Macroeconomic Influences on Social Security Disability Insurance Application 
Rates,” Journal of Insurance Issues, vol. 34, no. 2 (2011), pp. 112-150, http://econpapers.repec.org/article/wrijournl/
v_3a34_3ay_3a2011_3ai_3a2_3ap_3a112-150.htm. The authors compute the wage gap “by dividing a national labor 
productivity index produced from data published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics by the annual earnings of workers 
with only a high school degree.” The wage gap measures “the decline in relative earnings power of individuals with 
only a high school degree.” 
81 See Autor and Duggan 2006, as well as Muller 2008. Muller contends that the overall increase in the average 
replacement rate does not offer low-income workers large incentives to drop out of the labor force and apply for SSDI, 
especially since changes in replacements rates appear much smaller for low-income earners relative to medium and 
high-income earners (author’s calculations). Autor and Duggan argue that the high-wage replacement of SSDI benefits 
relative to available compensation makes SSDI enrollment particularly attractive to low-income workers, citing that in 
2004, males aged 40 to 64 without a high school degree were five times as likely to receive SSDI benefits relative to 
males with a college degree (authors’ calculations).  
82 Kaiser Family Foundation, Health Care Costs: A Primer, Figure 16, May 9, 2012, p. 19, http://www.kff.org/
insurance/7670.cfm. Health insurance premiums are for family premiums based on a family of four. 
83 Carmen DeNavas-Walt, Bernadette D. Proctor, and Jessica C. Smith, Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance 
Coverage in the United States: 2010, Census Bureau, Current Population Reports, P60-239, Table C-1, September 
2011, p. 77, http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/p60-239.pdf. Between 1999 and 2010, the percentage of the 
population covered by government health insurance increased from 24.2% to 31.0%. However, the overall percentage 
of the population covered by any health insurance declined during this period from 86.4% to 83.7%. 
84 See Jae Kennedy, Ph.D. and Elizabeth Blodgett, M.H.P.A., Health Insurance–Motivated Disability Enrollment and 
the ACA, The New England Journal of Medicine, September 20, 2012, http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/
NEJMp1208212. 
85 For more information on ACA, see CRS Report R41664, ACA: A Brief Overview of the Law, Implementation, and 
Legal Challenges, coordinated by C. Stephen Redhead. 
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apply for SSDI in order to qualify for Medicare, thereby abating the incidence of benefit receipt. 
Yet, it remains to be seen whether ACA will have a meaningful effect on the SSDI prevalence rate 
in the future. 
A Lack of Consistency in the Initial Determination Process 
As earlier noted, DDS examiners used a combination of medical, vocational, and functional 
evidence to determine whether a claimant’s impairment precludes him or her from engaging in 
SGA.86 Although DDS examiners base their initial determinations on uniform guidelines 
established by SSA, regional differences in demographic, health, and employment characteristics 
may produce variation in initial allowance rates between DDS offices.87 However, a recent study 
by the RAND Corporation found an appreciable degree of variation in determination outcomes 
across examiners within the same DDS office.88 The study estimated that up to 60% of applicants 
“could have received a different initial determination from at least one other examiner in the DDS 
office.”89 Even though the appeals process mitigated some of this variation, the study concluded 
that up to 23% of claimants could have ultimately received a different outcome had another 
examiner in the DDS office performed the determination.90  
The uncertainty of an outcome at the initial determination level due to variation across DDS 
examiners may have encouraged denied claimants to pursue the appeals process, thereby 
increasing their likelihood of SSDI receipt. The aforementioned study found that claimants 
denied by strict examiners were more likely to appeal their determinations.91 Between FY1986 
and FY2010, the number of dispositions conducted by Administrative Law Judges (ALJ) at the 
hearing level increased 242.3% (from 215,489 to 737,616).92 Although most of the awards 
granted by SSA during this period were made at the initial determination level, ALJs adjudicated 
the highest allowance rate of any level in the determination or appeals process.93 In FY2010, the 
allowance rate at the hearing level was 62%, compared with 35% at the initial level, 13% at the 
                                                 
86 For information on medical considerations, residual functional capacity, and vocational considerations, see 20 C.F.R. 
§ 404.1525, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545, and 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560, respectively. 
87 For additional information, see Alexander Strand, Social Security Disability Programs: Assessing the Variation in 
Allowance Rates, Social Security Administration, ORES Working Paper no. 98, August 2002, http://www.ssa.gov/
policy/docs/workingpapers/wp98.html. See also Norma B. Coe et al., What Explains Variation in SSDI Application 
Rates?, Center for Retirement Research at Boston College, WP#2011-23, http://crr.bc.edu/working-papers/what-
explains-state-variation-in-ssdi-application-rates/. 
88 Nicole Maestas, Kathleen J. Mullen, and Alexander Strand, Does Disability Insurance Receipt Discourage Work? 
Using Examiner Assignment to Estimate Causual Effects of SSDI Receipt, RAND Corporation, Working Paper WR-
853.3, June 2012, p. 23, http://www.rand.org/pubs/working_papers/WR853-3.html (hereinafter cited as “Maestas, 
Mullen, and Strand 2012”). 
89 U.S. Congress, House Ways and Means, Social Security, Third in a Hearing Series on Securing the Future of the 
Social Security Disability Insurance Program, 112th Cong., 2nd sess., March 20, 2012, 112-SS14, Testimony of Nicole 
Maestas, p. 3, http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/nicolemaestas_ss_3_20_12s.pdf. 
90 Ibid. Note that although the study found that 23% of applicants could have received a different outcome, there is no 
guarantee that the applicants would have received a different decision had their cases been assigned to a different DDS 
examiner.  
91 Maestas, Mullen, and Strand 2012, p. 23. 
92 SSAB Data and Materials 2012, Table 49, p. 54. Dispositions include decisions and dismissals. In FY2010, of the 
737,616 dispositions before ALJs, 2,170 were for OASI cases, 232,801 for SSDI-only cases, 200,681 for SSI-only 
cases, and 301,964 for concurrent SSDI and SSI cases. For more information, see SSA Annual Statistical Supplement 
2012, Table 2.F9. 
93 SSAB Data and Materials 2012, Table 7, p. 12. 
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reconsideration level, 2% at the Appeals Council level, and 4% at the federal court level.94 The 
RAND study found that of the denied claimants who contested their initial determination, 75% 
had their denial overturned eventually on appeal.95 The increased use of the appeals process due 
to variation across DDS examiners, coupled with higher allowance rates at the hearing level, may 
have contributed to the growth in the SSDI program.96 
Changes in Federal Policy  
The SSDI program of today looks quite different from the one created in 1956. At its inception, 
the program only provided cash benefits to workers aged 50 to 64 and disabled adult children 
whose disability began before the age of 18.97 Since then, the program has expanded to cover 
dependents and workers under the age of 50, as well as provide health care for disabled-worker 
beneficiaries. The following subsection explores how legislative changes to both program 
eligibility criteria and OASI benefits in the early 1980s may have helped to enlarge SSDI rolls. 
The Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984 
The Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980 (P.L. 96-265) vastly expanded the use of 
continuing disability reviews (CDR) as a means of reducing the growth in program costs. CDRs 
are periodic medical reevaluations to determine whether disabled beneficiaries continue to meet 
SSA’s definition of disability. Between January 1982 and the fall of 1984, SSA issued benefit 
termination notices to 490,000 of the 1.2 million SSDI beneficiaries subjected to a CDR.98 
However, the rise in beneficiary terminations due to CDRs sparked a degree of public outcry and 
had “a very damaging effect on the public perception of SSA’s administration of the disability 
program.”99 News stories at the time often depicted the economic and emotional difficulties faced 
by recently terminated beneficiaries and their dependents.100 Ultimately, of the 490,000 
beneficiaries who received termination notices because of CDRs, approximately 200,000 had 
their benefits reinstated on appeal.101 
In response to the contention over the increased use of CDRs, Congress unanimously enacted a 
series of reforms to improve consistency and uniformity in the disability determination process.102 
The Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984 (P.L. 98-460) changed the statutory standards for 
                                                 
94 Social Security Administration, SSA FY 2012 Budget Justification, Table 3.20, February 2011, p. 103, 
http://www.ssa.gov/budget/. Since FY2010, the allowance rate at the hearing level has decreased markedly, declining 
from 62% in FY2010 to 52% in FY2012. For more information, see Social Security Administration, SSA FY 2014 
Budget Justification, Table 3.26, April 2013, p. 134, http://www.ssa.gov/budget/FY14Files/2014FJ.pdf. 
95 Maestas, Mullen, and Strand 2012, p. 11.  
96 See Autor and Duggan 2006, p. 20-23.  
97 Kearney 2006, pp. 10-11. 
98 Ibid., p. 14. 
99 Kearney 2006, p. 15.  
100 “Cutoffs for Mentally Ill Bring Moratorium Plea,” The New York Times, April 9, 1983, http://www.nytimes.com/
1983/04/10/us/cutoffs-for-mentally-ill-bring-moratorium-plea.html?n=
Top%2fReference%2fTimes%20Topics%2fSubjects%2fF%2fFinances. 
101 Kearney 2006, p. 16. 
102 Katharine P. Collins and Anne Erfle, “Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984: Legislative History 
and Summary of Provisions,” Social Security Bulletin, vol. 48, no. 4, (April 1985), p. 5, http://199.173.224.108/policy/
docs/ssb/v48n4/v48n4p5.pdf. 
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evaluating disability in a variety of ways. First, it revised the medical eligibility criteria for CDRs 
so that SSA can only terminate the benefits of a recipient due to a medical improvement if the 
agency finds substantial evidence demonstrating medical improvement related to the recipient’s 
ability to work since his or her most recent favorable determination.103 Under the 1980 
amendments, SSA treated medical CDRs as a new determination and therefore did not evaluate a 
beneficiary’s impairment relative to the previous determination. Second, it amended the mental 
disorders category of the Listing of Impairments to give greater weight to functional 
capabilities.104 Before the reforms, disability determinations primarily relied on medical factors, 
which tended to disfavor claimants with mental impairments from benefit receipt. Third, it 
required SSA to consider the combined effect of multiple non-severe impairments on the 
claimant’s ability to engage in SGA.105 Prior to the 1984 amendments, a disability determination 
could not proceed unless the claimant had one or more independently severe impairments.106 
In enacting the 1984 amendments, Congress effectively relaxed the eligibility criteria needed to 
qualify for SSDI—relative to the 1980 amendments—for certain diagnostic groups such as 
musculoskeletal and mental disorders. Whereas the revision of the Listing of Impairments to give 
greater weight to functional capabilities permitted more claimants with mental impairment to 
qualify for SSDI, the allowance of the combined effect of multiple non-severe impairments made 
it easier for claimants with musculoskeletal impairments to enroll in the program.107 
Consequently, the percent distribution of awards to disabled-worker beneficiaries by diagnostic 
group started to change over time.108 As Figure 6 illustrates, the share of newly awarded 
beneficiaries with mental impairments increased from 10.3% in 1981 to 19.2% in 2011, whereas 
the portion of newly awarded beneficiaries with musculoskeletal impairments rose from 16.7% to 
33.8% during the same period.109 
                                                 
103 Kearney 2006, p. 17. See also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594.   
104 Ibid. For information on the Listing of Impairments, please see the Social Security Administration publication 
Disability Evaluation Under Social Security, available at http://www.ssa.gov/disability/professionals/bluebook/. This 
publication is commonly referred to as the SSA Blue Book. For more information on functional capabilities, please see 
Appendix 2 to Subpart P of Part 404 - Medical-Vocational Guidelines in 20 C.F.R. § 404. 
105 Kearney 2006, p. 17. See also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523. 
106 Social Security Administration, A History of the Social Security Disability Programs, January 1986, 
http://www.ssa.gov/history/1986dibhistory.html. For more information on the distinction between severe and non-
severe impairments, please see Social Security Administration, DI 22001.015 Severe/Non-Severe Impairment(s), July 
2012, https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0422001015. See also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c) and 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521. 
107 Most of the growth in mental disorders stems from workers under age 50, while most of the growth in 
musculoskeletal impairments stems from workers over age 50. For more information, see SSDI Annual Report 2011, 
Tables 41-42, pp. 109-116. 
108 Autor and Duggan 2006, p. 11. 
109 SSDI Annual Report 2011, Table 40, pp. 103-108. 
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Figure 6. The Percent Distribution of Newly Awarded Disabled-Worker Beneficiaries 
By Diagnostic Group (1981-2011) 
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Source: Computed from the Social Security Administration, Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security 
Disability Insurance Program, 2011, Table 40, pp. 103-108. 
Notes: For information on the diagnostic categories, please see the Listing of Impairments in the Social Security 
Administration publication Disability Evaluation Under Social Security, available at http://www.SSA.gov/disability/
professionals/bluebook/. This publication is commonly referred to as the SSA Blue Book. 
The change in the percentage distribution of awards to disabled-worker beneficiaries by 
diagnostic group may have increased the program prevalence rate, insofar as beneficiaries with 
mental and musculoskeletal impairments stay on SSDI longer relative to beneficiaries with 
certain other impairments (e.g., injuries or infections).110 Beneficiaries with mental or 
musculoskeletal impairments experience low mortality rates, moderate recovery rates, and high 
retirement conversation rates, all of which result in a long average duration of benefit receipt.111 
Moreover, since beneficiaries with mental impairments are typically younger, their time on SSDI 
rolls could last decades.112 
                                                 
110 Kalman Rupp and Charles G. Scott, “Trends in the Characteristics of DI and SSI Disability Awardees and Duration 
of Program Participation,” Social Security Bulletin, vol. 59, no. 1, (January 1996), pp. 6-7, http://www.ssa.gov/policy/
docs/ssb/v59n1/index.html (hereinafter cited as “Rupp and Scott 1996”). See also Autor and Duggan 2006, pp.11-12. 
111 Rupp and Scott 1996, Table 1, p. 6. Rupp and Scott examined the age and diagnostic mix of new SSDI cohorts 
between 1975 and 1993. Recovery, death, and termination rates based on the percent distribution of reasons for 
completion of first SSDI disability spell by diagnostic group. Musculoskeletal recovery rates are higher for younger 
individuals (aged 18 to 34). See also John C. Hennessey and Janice M. Dykacz, “A Comparison of the Recovery 
Termination Rates of Disabled-Worker Beneficiaries Entitled in 1972 and 1985,” Social Security Bulletin, vol. 56, no. 
2, (Summer 1993), pp. 60-61, http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v56n2/v56n2p58.pdf. 
112 Rupp and Scott 1996, Table 2, p. 7. For a cohort of beneficiaries awarded benefits in 1972, younger beneficiaries 
(aged 18 to 34) under the diagnostic category “mental disorders” experienced an average duration of benefit receipt of 
25.5 years. 
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The Social Security Amendments of 1983 
Congress enacted the comprehensive Social Security Amendments of 1983 (P.L. 98-21) in 
response to the financial problems of the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) trust fund 
identified by the National Commission on Social Security Reform.113 To address the long-term 
sustainability of the OASI program, Congress incrementally increased the full retirement age 
(FRA) from 65 to 67, thereby expanding the maximum penalty for taking early retirement at age 
62 from a 20% to a 30% reduction in cash benefits (based on year of birth).114 The increase in 
FRA resulted in program savings that improved the solvency of the OASI trust fund.  
However, the statutory changes to OASI eligibility rules may have also exacerbated the SSDI 
prevalence rate in three important ways. First, the increase in FRA expanded the share of 
potential SSDI applicants in their most disability-prone years (aged 50 and older). Between 2003 
and 2012, the number of insured workers aged 65 to 66 rose from 228,000 to more than 2.4 
million.115 Since older workers suffer from higher disability rates, the increase in FRA likely 
pushed the SSDI incidence rate upward.116 Second, the increase in FRA lengthened the duration 
of benefit receipt for recipients close to retirement age.117 Prior to the 1983 amendments, SSA 
converted beneficiaries who turned age 65 from SSDI benefits to OASI retirement benefits. 
However, following the implementation of the amendments, beneficiaries aged 65 and older 
increasingly remained on SSDI longer, consequently aggravating the program prevalence rate. In 
December 2011, nearly 404,800 beneficiaries aged 65 to 66 received monthly SSDI payments 
from SSA.118 
Third, the rise in the maximum penalty for early retirement increased the value of disability cash 
benefits. Since the maximum monthly full retired-worker benefit is the same as the maximum 
monthly disabled-worker benefit, the maximum value of an early retirement benefit at the age of 
62 is 20%-30% less than the maximum value of a disability benefit, depending on year of birth. 
As a result, a growing number of OASDI insured workers aged 62 to FRA may have opted to 
apply for SSDI benefits in order to maximize their annual compensation. Recent studies suggest 
that the increasing value of disability benefits relative to early retirement benefits induces 
individuals to apply for SSDI benefits.119 However, researchers are divided over the extent to 
                                                 
113 For more information, see the National Commission on Social Security Reform, Report of the National Commission 
on Social Security Reform, January 1983, http://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/gspan.html. 
114 See Social Security Administration, Social Security Amendments of 1983, http://www.ssa.gov/history/
1983amend2.html. For more information on changes to the full retirement age, see CRS Report R41962, Fact Sheet: 
The Social Security Retirement Age, by Gary Sidor. For additional information on the graduated increase in the early 
retirement penalty, see Social Security Administration, Retirement Planner: Benefits By Year Of Birth, October 17, 
2012, http://www.socialsecurity.gov/retire2/agereduction.htm. 
115 For insured worker data, see Social Security Administration, Disability Insured Workers, http://www.ssa.gov/oact/
STATS/table4c2DI.html. 
116 For more information, see U.S. Government Accountability Office, Raising the Retirement Ages Would Have 
Implications for Older Workers and SSA Disability Rolls, GAO-11-125, December 18, 2010, p. 27, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-125. 
117 CBO, Policy Options 2012, p. 9. 
118 SSA Annual SSDI Report 2011, Table 20, p. 60. 
119 See Norma B. Coe and Kelly Haverstick, Measuring the Spillover to Disability Insurance Due to the Rise in the Full 
Retirement Age, Center for Retirement Research at Boston College, CRR WP 2010-21, December 2010, p. 9-14, 
http://crr.bc.edu/working-papers/measuring-the-spillover-to-disability-insurance-due-to-the-rise-in-the-full-retirement-
age/ (hereinafter cited as “Coe and Haverstick 2010”). In addition, see Mark Duggan, Perry Singleton, and Jae Song, 
Aching to Retire? The Rise in the Full Retirement Age and its Impact on the Disability Rolls, National Bureau of 
(continued...) 
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which individuals aged 62 to FRA who apply for disability benefits based on their relative value 
to early retirement benefits actually receive an award from SSA.120  
Overview of Reform Proposals 
Since the effects of changes in the age-sex distribution of the population on SSDI rolls have for 
the most part run their course, SSA’s Chief Actuary estimates that the cost and income to the DI 
trust fund as a percentage of GDP will stabilize over the long term.121 However, the Chief Actuary 
projects the current gap between DI revenue and expenditures to remain persistent into the 
future.122 Without appropriate action, the Office of the Chief Actuary estimates that the DI trust 
fund reserves will be depleted in 2016, at which point the trust fund will have only enough 
revenue to pay 79% of scheduled benefits.123 To assist lawmakers in addressing the sustainability 
of the program, this section provides an overview of reform proposals to mitigate the prevalence 
of benefit receipt and thus reduce future program expenditures.124 The selected proposals 
discussed in this section come from a variety of sources, including academic researchers, 
advocacy organizations, government agencies, and the Social Security Advisory Board.125  
Stricter Eligibility Criteria 
One policy option to reduce the growth in SSDI rolls is to tighten the eligibility requirements for 
program enrollment. In general, the aim of enhancing eligibility criteria is to mitigate the number 
of future awardees with some capacity to work (i.e., claimants on the margin of program entry), 
while continuing to grant awards to claimants with little or no ability to engage in substantial 
gainful activity (SGA). In theory, claimants on the edge of program entry could potentially work 
above SGA; therefore, stricter eligibility criteria may affect marginal claimants less adversely 
                                                                 
(...continued) 
Economic Research, Working Paper 11811, December 2005, http://www.nber.org/papers/w11811 (hereinafter cited as 
“Duggan, Singleton, and Song 2005”). 
120 Ibid. Using aggregate data, Duggan, Singleton, and Song found that the 1983 amendments increased SSDI 
enrollment 0.58 percentage points for men (aged 45 to 64) and 0.89 percentage points for women (aged 45 to 64) 
between 1983 and 2005. Using disaggregate data, Coe and Haverstick found that a 1 percentage point decrease in the 
ratio of retirement to disability benefits resulted in a 0.25 percentage point increase in the application rate for 
individuals born between 1938 and 1943. However, the researchers found no evidence that the increase in FRA resulted 
in a rise in the incidence of SSDI receipt among individuals aged 55 to FRA born between 1938 and 1941 (1942 and 
1943 cohorts had not reached FRA).  
121 Testimony of Stephen C. Goss 2013, pp. 4-5. Projections based on the Social Security Board of Trustees’ 2012 
intermediate assumptions. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Ibid., p. 1. 
124 In addition to reducing the prevalence of benefit receipt, there are a number of other reform options for improving 
the solvency of the DI trust fund. For example, changing the formula for calculating benefits or slowing the growth in 
COLAs via chained CPI would both abate future program costs (see CBO, Policy Options 2012). Alternatively, raising 
additional revenue by increasing the taxable earnings base would help to close the gap between program costs and 
income. For more information on changes to the taxable earnings base, see CRS Report RL33943, Increasing the 
Social Security Payroll Tax Base: Options and Effects on Tax Burdens, by Thomas L. Hungerford and CRS Report 
RL32896, Social Security: Raising or Eliminating the Taxable Earnings Base, by Janemarie Mulvey. 
125 The Social Security Advisory Board is an independent board tasked with advising the Commissioner of Social 
Security on issues related to OASDI and SSI. For more information, see 42 U.S.C. § 903. 
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compared to more severely disabled claimants.126 However, there is no guarantee that all the 
claimants on the margin of program entry have either the capacity or opportunity to engage in 
SGA. Thus, stricter eligibility criteria may inadvertently deny benefits to claimants with little or 
no ability to work at all. Although it is difficult to discern which type of claimants would be 
affected by more stringent eligibility requirements, a recent study found that marginal program 
entrants are more likely to be younger, suffer from mental impairments, and have low earnings 
histories.127 
This subsection examines several options for increasing the eligibility criteria of the SSDI 
program, which the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) outlined and scored in its 2012 report, 
Policy Options for the Social Security Disability Insurance Program.128 
Increase the Recency-of-Work Requirement 
As mentioned earlier, to qualify for disability benefits, a worker must typically have 40 credits 
(quarters of coverage), 20 of which were earned in the last 10 years ending with the year of 
disability onset.129 In other words, disability claimants must have generally worked five of the 
past 10 years to be eligible for SSDI. The recency-of-work requirement (sometimes known as the 
20/40 rule) restricts the program to individuals who have worked of late and for a reasonable 
length of time in covered employment.130  
CBO recently estimated the impact of increasing the recency-of-work requirement on beneficiary 
enrollment. The agency projected that requiring disability claimants to have worked four of the 
past six years (instead of five of the past 10) starting in 2013 would have reduced the number of 
SSDI beneficiaries by 4% in 2022, as well as decreased program outlays by $8.0 billion in that 
year.131 
The stricter recency-of-work requirement would likely affect individuals with intermittent work 
histories, specifically workers with prolonged and sustained bouts of absence from covered 
employment due to unemployment or withdrawal from the labor force.132 A recent study found 
that while men report leaving the labor force primarily because of disability, women typically 
report leaving the labor force to care for someone in their household.133 Consequently, the more 
                                                 
126 Maestas, Mullen, and Strand 2012, p. 22. Maestas, Mullen, and Strand found that the employment of marginal 
program entrants would have been on average 28 percentage points higher two years after the initial determination had 
they not received SSDI. This figure drops to 16 percentage points four years after the initial determination. However, 
these estimations reflect economic and labor market conditions between 2005 and 2006, and therefore may not hold 
during instances of high unemployment such as the December 2007 to June 2009 recession. 
127 Ibid., p. 5. 
128 CBO, Policy Options 2012. 
129 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.130(b)(2). 
130 CRS Report (Archived), Social Security: Summary of Major Changes in the Cash Benefits Program, May 18, 2000, 
available at http://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/crsleghist2.html. 
131 CBO, Policy Options 2012, p. 18. 
132 Unemployment refers to all individuals aged 16 and over who do not have a job, have actively looked for work in 
the prior four weeks, and are currently available for work. Individuals out of the labor force are currently not working 
and not actively looking for a job. 
133 Julie L. Hotchkiss, M. Melinda Pitts, and Fernando Rios-Avila, A Closer Look at Nonparticipants During and After 
the Great Recession, Federal Reserve Bank, Working Paper 2012-10, August 2012, p. 6, http://www.frbatlanta.org/
pubs/wp/12_10.cfm. 
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stringent recency-of-work requirement may disproportionately affect women who drop out of the 
labor force to act as caregivers.134  
Adjust the Age Categories for Vocational Factors 
As noted earlier, in addition to assessing an applicant’s medical condition, DDS examiners also 
take into account the individual’s ability to perform either any past relevant work or other work 
that exists in the national economy. Vocational factors such as age, education, and work 
experience—in combination with the individual’s residual functional capacity—help an examiner 
to determine whether an applicant’s impairment precludes him or her engaging in SGA. Since 
eligibility criteria based on education and work experience typically becomes less stringent with 
age, SSA is more likely to award benefits to older insured workers. Therefore, raising the upper 
age categories for vocational factors could mitigate the growth in the number of older 
beneficiaries (aged 45 to FRA) on SSDI rolls.  
Currently, SSA categorizes older workers across four age ranges: 45-49, 50-54, 55-59, and 60 and 
older.135 CBO examined the effects of increasing the 45-49 and 50-54 age ranges by two years to 
47-51 and 52-56 and making 57 to FRA the new maximum range, thereby eliminating the 45, 46, 
and 60 and older categories. According to CBO, implementing this policy option in 2013 would 
have decreased the number of SSDI beneficiaries by 50,000 or 0.5% in 2022, as well as reduced 
program expenditures by $1.0 billion in that year.136  
Adjusting the age categories for vocational factors would likely encourage older insured workers 
to seek out other potential income supports. Whereas workers aged 62 to FRA could apply for 
early retirement benefits, workers with a recent attachment to the labor force may choose to apply 
for other work-related supports such as state workers’ compensation, private disability insurance, 
or unemployment insurance. Meanwhile, low-income claimants would most likely apply for SSI 
and Medicaid in response to the adjustment in the age categories.137 
                                                 
134 In Collier v. Barnhart, Claire Collier, a wife and mother suffering from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS; also 
known as Lou Gehrig’s disease), filed suit in U.S. district court in 2005 against the Commissioner of Social Security, 
arguing that the recency-of-work requirement (or 20/40 rule) violated the equal protection component of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Although Mrs. Collier satisfied the quarters of coverage requirement for her 
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Appendix 2 to Subpart P of Part 404 - Medical-Vocational Guidelines in 20 C.F.R. § 404.  
136 CBO, Policy Options 2012, p. 18. Adjusting the age ranges of vocational factors would have also decreased 
participation in Medicare and thus reduced Medicare outlays. 
137 For more information on other potential income supports for SSDI applicants, see CRS Report RS22220, Social 
Security Disability Insurance (SSDI): The Five-Month Waiting Period for Benefits, by Umar Moulta-Ali. Adjusting the 
age ranges for vocational factors would have increased participation in and outlays to SSI and Medicaid, although CBO 
did not provide specific estimates. For more information see, CBO, Policy Options 2012, p. 18. 
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SSA explored raising the age categories in the past but ultimately decided against it. In November 
2005, SSA issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) that proposed to increase the age 
categories for older insured workers by two years.138 However, after collecting feedback from the 
public, SSA withdrew the NPRM in May of 2009.139 
Improved Program Administration 
Another reform option is to augment program consistency and integrity to reduce the number of 
non-meritorious claimants on SSDI. Variation in the application of SSA guidelines can distort the 
disability determination and adjudication process, resulting in the agency granting awards to non-
meritorious claimants or denying benefits to claimants with little or no capacity to work. 
Similarly, diminished program integrity—whether through waste, fraud, or abuse—may permit 
some beneficiaries to remain on SSDI in spite of their considerable work-related medical 
improvements. This subsection outlines reforms to the administration of the program that could 
conceivably reduce the growth in SSDI rolls. 
Changing the Hearing Level Process from Inquisitorial to Adversarial  
Claimants displeased with a determination at the reconsideration level of the appeals process may 
request a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), in writing, within 60 days upon 
receipt of the determination. At the hearing level, claimants may present additional evidence or 
arguments to support their case, as well as appoint a representative to act on their behalf (either an 
attorney or non-attorney). Since SSA is not represented at the hearing, the proceeding is 
considered inquisitorial or non-adversarial.140 Under an inquisitorial process, ALJs investigate the 
merits of an appeal by informally questioning the claimant, as well as any scheduled witnesses 
(i.e., medical or vocational experts). Proponents of the inquisitorial process argue that the 
informal nature of the proceedings and lack of cross-examination by an opposing attorney creates 
an environment conducive to a claimant sharing the information needed by the ALJ to make an 
informed decision.141  
However, opponents contend that inquisitorial process encumbers the ability of ALJs to make 
informed decisions on a consistent basis, inasmuch as the process forces ALJs to adjudicate 
appeals impartially while simultaneously representing the interests of both claimants and SSA.142 
                                                 
138 For more information, see Social Security Administration, “Age as a Factor in Evaluating Disability,” 70 Federal 
Register 67104, November 4, 2005.  
139 See Social Security Administration, “Age as a Factor in Evaluating Disability,” 74 Federal Register 21563, May 8, 
2009. 
140 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.900(b), 20 C.F.R. § 416.1400(b), and 20 C.F.R. § 405.1(c). 
141 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Social Security, Chairman Johnson 
Announces the Fourth in a Hearing Series on Securing the Future of the Social Security Disability Insurance Program, 
Testimony of Ethel Zelenske, 112th Cong., 2nd sess., June 27, 2012, http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/
zelenske_testimony.pdf. 
142 See Social Security Advisory Board, Charting the Future of Social Security’s Disability Programs: The Need for 
Fundamental Change, January 2001, p. 19, http://www.ssab.gov/Publications/Disability/disabilitywhitepap.pdf 
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According to the Association of Administrative Law Judges (AALJ), having to wear all three 
“hats” during a hearing sometimes places an ALJ in an untenable situation, in which the judge 
must represent clients whose interests are at odds with one another.143 Moreover, the difficulty of 
maintaining impartiality while simultaneously representing the interests of both parties may cause 
an ALJ to overlook a key piece of evidence or argument, consequently affecting the outcome of 
the decision.  
To improve the accuracy of appeals at the hearing level, both AALJ and the Social Security 
Advisory Board (SSAB) advocate switching from an inquisitorial to an adversarial process in 
which claimants and SSA are each afforded representation.144 The two organizations argue that 
the vigorous cross-examination of claimants by SSA representatives would provide ALJs with 
additional information and evidence with which to form their decisions, thereby creating greater 
consistency and accountability in the appeals process. According to SSAB, under the inquisitorial 
process, some ALJs may be reluctant to question claimants aggressively for fear of appearing to 
be biased.145 This hesitation may prevent ALJs from discovering all the evidence necessary to 
make fully informed decisions, consequently affecting hearing outcomes. Therefore, adopting an 
adversarial model could allow ALJs to investigate the history and extent of claimants’ medical 
impairments more thoroughly, resulting in better-reasoned decisions and greater judicial 
consistency. 
The potential for improved consistency and accountability at the hearing level may help to lower 
the overall allowance rate and thus reduce the growth in SSDI rolls. A January 2013 audit report 
by SSA’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) discovered wide variances in the allowance rates 
among ALJs between and within hearing offices.146 In addition, the report found a direct 
relationship between the number of cases adjudicated by ALJs (productivity) and allowance 
rates.147 In other words, high-allowance ALJs adjudicated more dispositions relative to the office 
average, whereas low-allowance ALJs adjudicated fewer dispositions compared with the office 
average. By improving the quality of decisions, the adversarial process could theoretically help to 
attenuate large variances in the allowance rates among ALJs, subsequently mitigating the number 
of non-meritorious claimants awarded SSDI. 
However, successfully implementing an adversarial process at the hearing level poses several 
challenges for SSA. First, switching from an inquisitorial to adversarial process would require 
additional expenditures to hire attorneys and appropriate staff. Disability hearings are already 
quite costly for SSA. In FY2011, the unit cost of adjudicating a disability hearing was $2,752.00, 
whereas the unit cost of processing an initial disability claim was only $1,058.44.148 Even though 
SSA representation may eventually produce budgetary savings by reducing the allowance rate at 
the hearing level, the conversion to an adversarial process would still present SSA with 
substantial costs in the short term.  
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Second, it is unclear whether the adversarial process at the hearing level would survive a legal 
challenge from denied claimants, inasmuch a federal judge issued an injunction against SSA’s 
previous adversarial pilot program in 1986.149 Third, due to a paucity of research on the subject, 
the effects of switching to an adversarial process are highly ambiguous and difficult to discern. To 
assess the feasibility of switching to an adversarial process today, SSA may need to conduct 
another demonstration project to determine whether SSA representation at the hearing level could 
improve consistency and accountability in a cost-effective manner.150  
Update SSA’s Listing of Impairments 
During the disability determination process, DDS examiners—with the help of medical and 
psychological consultants—typically use medical evidence collected from the claimant’s 
physicians, hospitals, clinics, or other institutions of treatment to determine the severity of the 
claimant’s impairment.151 In order to assess whether the impairment precludes the claimant from 
working, DDS examiners evaluate the impairment against the Listing of Impairments (hereinafter 
“listings”), which categorizes SSA approved medical conditions for disability across 14 major 
body systems for adults.152 SSA designed the listings to assist examiners in expediting claims by 
providing a uniform collection of medical conditions that prevent individuals from engaging in 
SGA. Most of the medical conditions contained in the listings are permanent or expected to result 
in death or a specific statement of duration.153 If the claimant’s impairment meets (or is of equal 
severity to) the criteria in the listings, SSA considers the claimant to have a work-limiting 
disability. Claimants who do not meet the medical criteria in the listings proceed to a more 
individualized assessment that examines their residual functional capacity to work, as well as 
vocational factors.154 
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Although the listings serve as a useful guide for DDS examiners, the percentage of awards 
determined by medical listings has decreased substantially over the years. According to SSAB, 
between FY1980 and FY2010, the share of initial allowances based on the claimant meeting the 
medical listings declined from 57.9% to 37.9%, whereas the portion of initial allowances based 
on the claimant having an impairment equal in severity fell from 16.2% to 7.9%.155 Conversely, 
the percentage of initial allowances based on vocational considerations increased during this 
period from 25.9% to 54.3%.156 SSAB, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and SSA’s 
OIG all attribute the decline in the percentage of cases decided based on the claimant’s medical 
condition to the increasingly outdated nature of the medical listings. In 2000, OIG found that SSA 
had not updated certain listings in over 10 years; moreover, SSA had not updated the listings for 
mental disorders in 15 years.157 In 2003, GAO identified SSDI as a high-risk program, inasmuch 
as the program relied on medical listings that did not reflect the impact of medical and 
technological advances on work-limiting medical conditions.158 
SSAB has expressed concern over the shift in the basis for decision from medical listings to 
vocational factors, to the extent that cases decided based on vocational considerations may 
require a more substantial degree of subjectivity relative to cases determined based on medical 
listings.159 In other words, determinations based primarily on carefully researched medical 
impairments may be less prone to individual examiner bias than cases decided using the 
claimant’s residual functional capacity to work in the national economy. Indeed, the reduced 
reliance on medical listings may explain some of the aforementioned variation in initial disability 
determinations across DDS examiners. 
To improve the quality and accuracy of disability determinations, SSA initiated a two-tiered 
process for updating its medical listings beginning in 2003.160 Under the new process, the agency 
first completes a comprehensive revision of each listing category, taking into account any medical 
disorder or disease that may inhibit an individual’s ability to work.161 Once the comprehensive 
update is complete, SSA conducts periodic reviews of each listing category to ensure that the 
listings are current. According to SSA officials, the agency has completed comprehensive 
revisions to ten of the fourteen major adult body systems.162 However, SSA has experienced 
delays in completing comprehensive updates to the remaining four major adult body systems.163 
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SSA has still not completed a final revision of the listing for mental disorders—SSDI’s second 
most diagnosed impairment—despite the fact that the impairment category last received a 
comprehensive update in 1985.164 SSA officials attribute the delay to a shortage of qualified staff, 
in addition to the enormous complexity of implementing and revising new medical listings.165 The 
agency hopes to complete comprehensive revisions to the four remaining adult body systems by 
the end of FY2014.166 
Updated medical listings that take into account medical and technological advances, as well as 
changes in the labor market, could allow DDS examiners to better identify individuals with 
severe work-limiting disabilities, while screening out non-meritorious claimants who could 
potentially engage in SGA. However, the impact of updated medical listings on the prevalence of 
benefit receipt remains unclear, in that claimants denied at the medical listings stage of the 
determination process may still be awarded SSDI at the subsequent vocational stages.  
Update SSA’s Occupational Information System 
If a claimant fails to meet the eligibility criteria outlined in the medical listings, SSA will proceed 
with a more individualized assessment that examines the claimant’s ability to engage in SGA. To 
“minimize subjectivity and promote national consistency,” SSA employs a system of medical and 
vocational rules designed to assist examiners in discerning whether a claimant can perform either 
any past relevant work or other work that exists in the national economy.167 SSA considers 
claimants who cannot perform any other work to be disabled and therefore eligible for SSDI. 
Currently, SSA uses the Department of Labor’s Dictionary of Occupation Titles (DOT) to 
determine the physical and mental demands of available work in the national economy; however, 
because DOT last received a major update in 1977, its occupational information is largely 
outdated and thus unrepresentative of the employment opportunities that exist in the modern U.S. 
economy.168 Although the Department of Labor replaced DOT with a new database in 1998—
known as the Occupational Information Network (O*NET)—SSA concluded that the new 
database’s occupational information was insufficient to meet its requirements.169 A recent Senate 
report expressed concern over SSA’s use of DOT, in that the system’s increasingly outdated 
occupational information may award benefits to claimants who could conceivably work in 
occupations not detailed in DOT.170  
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To improve program consistency, SSA established the Occupational Information Development 
Advisory Panel in December of 2008 to research and develop a new occupational information 
system (OIS) for use in the vocational stages of the disability determination process.171 In July 
2012, SSA signed an interagency agreement with the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) to test the 
viability of using BLS’ National Compensation Survey (NCS) to collect updated occupational 
data for the new OIS.172 According to SSA, the agency plans to conduct ongoing testing and 
analysis of its data collection process in FY2013 and FY2014, with the expectation of 
implementing the new OIS starting in FY2016.173 
In the future, SSA’s updated OIS may help to mitigate the growth in SSDI rolls. According to 
SSA, the occupational information in DOT reflects an industrial economy, whereas today’s 
economy has become more service oriented.174 As a result, modern occupations that require less 
physical exertion may allow individuals with certain disabilities to remain in the labor force. By 
updating its OIS to reflect current jobs in the national economy, SSA could potentially reduce the 
incidence of benefit receipt. 
However, not all individuals with disabilities have the capacity to work in today’s highly 
competitive, albeit somewhat less physically demanding, job market.175 For example, older 
individuals with disabilities may have difficulty adjusting to the intensity and pressure of many of 
today’s employment opportunities, whereas individuals with less extensive education may be less 
suited to “cognitively demanding” work.176 Thus, some individuals with disabilities may lack the 
capacity to perform any work in the national economy, even after taking into account updated 
occupational data. 
Increase the Number of CDRs Performed By SSA 
Unlike program consistency reforms that reduce the incidence of benefit receipt, program 
integrity policies such as continuing disability reviews (CDR) terminate the benefits of recipients 
who fail to adhere to program rules and requirements. Medical CDRs are periodic reevaluations 
to determine whether disabled beneficiaries continue to meet SSA’s definition of disability. If 
SSA finds substantial evidence of medical improvement related to a beneficiary’s ability to work, 
the agency may consider the beneficiary no longer disabled and subsequently terminate his or her 
benefits. Increasing the number of medical CDRs performed by SSA has the potential to expand 
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the recovery rate of beneficiaries with work-related medical improvements and thus abate the 
growth in SSDI rolls. 
Periodic medical evaluations are one of the most cost-effective tools for improving program 
integrity.177 In FY2010, the 324,567 full medical CDRs performed by the agency resulted in 
82,422 initial decisions to cease benefits, as well as 2,152 initial decisions to terminate benefits 
because of beneficiaries’ failure to cooperate (FTC) with SSA during the disability review 
process. 178 After all appeals, SSA’s Office of the Chief Actuary (OCAct) estimated that the CDRs 
conducted in FY2010 would ultimately terminate the benefits of 57,272 disabled-worker 
beneficiaries and their dependents.179 For every $1.0 spent on CDRs in FY2010, OCAct estimated 
approximately $9.3 in future program savings.180 
However, a significant reduction in funding for CDRs between FY2003 and FY2007 left SSA 
with fewer resources with which to conduct disability reviews, resulting in an accretive backlog 
of medical CDRs.181 In March of 2010, SSA’s OIG estimated a backlog of 1.5 million full 
medical CDRs at the end of FY2010.182 Had SSA performed all full medical CDRs when they 
were originally scheduled between calendar years (CY) 2005 through CY2010, OIG estimated 
that the agency would have removed approximately 90,000 to 180,000 beneficiaries from the 
rolls, thereby avoiding between $1.3 billion to $2.6 billion in payments to SSI, SSDI, and 
concurrent beneficiaries.183 In spite of recent efforts to address the backlog, SSA estimated 1.3 
million pending CDRs at the end of FY2012.184 
To address the mounting backlog of CDRs and enhance program integrity, advocacy 
organizations, academic researchers, and President Obama all have expressed their support for 
increasing CDR funding.185 The Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25), which caps 
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discretionary spending and increases the federal government’s statutory debt limit, includes a 
provision to adjust the discretionary spending caps to permit additional appropriations to SSA for 
program integrity activities such as CDRs and SSI redeterminations.186 In March 2013, SSA 
estimated that if Congress had appropriated the maximum amount allowed for program integrity 
activities in FY2012, the agency would have completed an additional 126,000 full medical CDRs, 
thereby saving approximately $800 million in SSDI, SSI, Medicare, and Medicaid expenditures 
between FY2012 and FY2022.187 Alternatively, the President’s FY2014 budget proposes 
replacing the discretionary spending caps established under the Budget Control Act of 2011 with 
a dedicated source of mandatory funding to enable SSA to conduct more CDRs and SSI 
redeterminations on a consistent basis.188 According to the President’s FY2014 budget, the 
requested $1.227 billion in mandatory funding and $273 million in discretionary base funding 
would allow SSA to perform at least 650,000 CDRs and at least 2.6 million SSI 
redeterminations.189 
Even with additional funding, increasing the number of CDRs poses a challenge for SSA. High 
attrition rates, hiring freezes, and employee furloughs have affected SSA’s ability to process 
CDRs. In response to budget deficits, some states instituted furloughs or hiring freezes for state 
employees following the last recession, including DDS examiners.190 The contraction in the 
number of DDS examiners limited SSA’s ability to conduct determinations and contributed to the 
backlog of CDRs. To combat the reduction in state DDS examiners, SSA transferred a portion of 
disability cases from furloughed DDS offices to non-furloughed DDS offices in other states; in 
addition, the agency hired more than 2,600 DDS employees in FY2009 and FY2010.191 However, 
due to an agency-wide hiring freeze starting in FY2011, SSA stopped DDS hiring in FY2011 and 
did only limited critical hiring in FY2012.192 The reduction in DDS hiring between FY2011 and 
FY2012 coincided with high rates of attrition for existing DDS employees. In 2012, 15 field 
offices witnessed a 30% reduction in staff levels and nearly one-third of all field offices 
experienced attrition rates of more than 10%.193 Because of the combination of attrition and hiring 
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freezes, SSA lost more than 1,200 DDS employees in FY2011 and 1,025 DDS employees in 
FY2012.194 
Although additional funding would augment SSA’s ability to perform CDRs by allowing the 
agency to hire new examiners, the shortage of veteran examiners with the experience to conduct 
CDRs may prevent SSA from completing all scheduled disability reviews. Part of the problem 
stems from the fact that DDS examiners experience high rates of turnover. According to GAO, 
over 20% of DDS examiners hired between September of 1998 and January of 2006 left or were 
terminated within their first year.195 Of the DDS examiners who remain, it takes on average two 
years of training and experience before SSA considers them to be fully trained.196 Therefore, even 
if Congress appropriated additional funds immediately for SSA, it may take the agency years to 
reestablish a robust pool of highly experienced DDS examiners. 
Return-to-Work Incentives 
Another policy option to combat the growth in SSDI rolls is to provide stronger incentives for 
beneficiaries to return to the labor force. To encourage beneficiaries to return to the labor force, 
SSA allows beneficiaries to test their ability to work by participating in a 9-month Trial Work 
Period (TWP), during which participants may earn any amount within a rolling 60-month period 
without having their benefits terminated or reduced.197 Moreover, SSA provides employment 
services to equip beneficiaries with the training and support structure needed to find employment 
in a competitive job market. In spite of the services offered by SSA, very few beneficiaries 
permanently leave the SSDI program. In 2011, SSA terminated the benefits of only 0.5% of all 
disabled-worker recipients due to earnings above SGA.198 This subsection outlines policies that 
may help to increase the return-to-work rate of SSDI beneficiaries and thus reduce the average 
duration of benefit receipt.199  
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Increase Awareness of Return-to-Work Services 
To address some of the barriers to employment faced by beneficiaries with disabilities, Congress 
enacted the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999 (P.L. 106-170), which 
established the Ticket to Work and Self-Sufficiency program (hereinafter “Ticket to Work”).200 
Ticket to Work assists beneficiaries between the ages of 18 and 64 in returning to the labor force 
by providing a voucher or ticket for employment, vocational rehabilitation (VR), or other support 
services through public or private contractors known as Employment Networks (EN), as well as 
traditional State VR agencies (SVRA). Participation in the Ticket to Work program is voluntary, 
and ticket holders (beneficiaries) decide when and whether to assign a ticket to a particular EN or 
SVRA. Under the program, SVRAs and ENs receive payments from SSA for services provided to 
ticket holders based on specific work-related performances measures. 
Thus far, the Ticket to Work program has met with little success. Although program participants 
are more likely to have employment relative to other beneficiaries, only about 2.2% of all 
“active” tickets issued by SSA are “in use” by beneficiaries (i.e., assigned to an EN or SVRA).201 
According to GAO, EN representatives partially attribute Ticket to Work’s low beneficiary 
participation rate to “a lack of understanding and awareness of the program,” while some 
disability-rights organizations contend that the fear of losing benefits may deter beneficiaries 
from taking part in the program.202 
To improve the return-to-work rate of SSDI recipients, researchers Bonnie O’Day and David 
Stapleton have proposed testing early intervention policies that provide beneficiaries with 
employment and other support services shortly after receipt of benefits.203 The researchers argue 
that current employment services such as Ticket to Work have failed to increase the return-to-
work rate, inasmuch as many beneficiaries “have been separated from the labor force, often for 
years, before they are offered assistance.”204 By providing beneficiaries with employment and 
other support services earlier during their stay on SSDI (i.e., when their attachment to the labor 
force is relatively strong), the researchers posit that said beneficiaries may have a greater chance 
of returning to work. 
One early intervention option is to require all future beneficiaries to participate in mandatory 
work preparation counseling in order to educate them on the variety of return-to-work services 
offered by SSA.205 Mandatory counseling has the potential to elucidate beneficiary confusion 
                                                 
200 For more information on the Ticket to Work program, see CRS Report R41934, Ticket to Work and Self-Sufficiency 
Program: Overview and Current Issues, by Umar Moulta-Ali (hereinafter cited as “CRS Report R41934”). 
201 Gina A. Livermore and Allison Roche, “Longitudinal Outcomes of an Early Cohort of Ticket to Work Participants,” 
Social Security Bulletin, vol. 71, no. 3, (August 2011), pp. 105-116, http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v71n3/
v71n3p105.html. According to the study, in 2004, 32% of Ticket to Work participants were employed compared with 
only 9% of all SSDI and SSI beneficiaries. For more information on the number of tickets “in use,” see CRS Report 
R41934. 
202 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Ticket to Work Participation Has Increased, but Additional Oversight 
Needed, GAO-11-324, May 6, 2011, p. 11, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-324. 
203 Bonnie O’Day and David Stapleton, The United Kingdom Pathways to Work Program: A Path to Employment?, 
Mathematica Policy Research, Inc., Number 08-02, September 2008, http://www.mathematica-mpr.com/publications/
PDFs/pathways_disbrief2.pdf (hereinafter cited as “O’Day and Stapleton 2008”). 
204 Ibid., p. 1. 
205 The agency could exempt beneficiaries with a low probability of recovery from the counseling requirement, since 
they are less likely to return to work compared to other beneficiaries. 
 Congressional Research Service 35 
regarding return-to-work services, which may in turn increase the likelihood of beneficiary 
participation in programs such as Ticket to Work. Although mandatory work preparation 
counseling would require new funding to hire additional SSA affiliated counselors, the counseling 
may be cost-effective if it improves the return-to-work rate of SSDI recipients.  
To demonstrate the benefits of early intervention, O’Day and Stapleton point to the United 
Kingdom’s (UK’s) recently discontinued Pathways to Work program as an example of how 
mandatory participation in work preparation can improve beneficiary employment outcomes.206 
Like Ticket to Work, Pathways to Work was designed to encourage beneficiaries with disabilities 
to return to work by providing employment support services. Although participation in Pathways 
to Work was voluntary, starting in 2008, new beneficiaries were required to participate in six 
Work Focused Interviews (WFI), during which advisors provided beneficiaries with information 
on optional employment services and financial incentives for returning to work.207 A cost-benefit 
analysis conducted by the UK’s Department of Work and Pensions concluded that WFIs and 
return-to-work tax credits were the most expensive components of Pathways to Work; however, 
the study noted that the program ultimately yielded a net societal benefit of £3.06 ($5.56) for 
every £1.00 ($1.82) invested in Pathways to Work.208 Another study found that the Pathways to 
Work program increased the probability of a beneficiary having a job by 7.4 percentage points.209 
Currently, SSA oversees two voluntary grant programs aimed at increasing beneficiary awareness 
of return-to-work services. In addition to the Ticket to Work program, P.L. 106-170 also 
established the Work Incentives Planning and Assistance (WIPA) program and the Protection and 
Advocacy for Beneficiaries of Social Security (PABSS).210 The WIPA program awards grants to 
community organizations that provide education and assistance for beneficiaries interested in 
returning to work, whereas the PABSS program provides grants for legal assistance and advice on 
how to obtain VR, employment, or other services for work-oriented beneficiaries.  
Estimating the overall impact of mandatory counseling on the SSDI beneficiary return-to-work 
rate is difficult because the results of SSA’s current employment-counseling initiatives are 
inconclusive. According to one study, the use of WIPA services possibly has a positive effect on 
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the employment outcomes of SSI/SSDI beneficiaries; however, the study’s researchers cautioned 
against drawing a causal relationship between receipt of WIPA services and employment 
outcomes.211 In essence, the researchers were unable to discern whether beneficiaries who 
received WIPA services would have enjoyed the same employment outcome in the absence of 
such assistance.  
In addition, program rules concerning eligibility and benefit levels could make SSDI less 
responsive to the positive effects of mandatory counseling relative to other disability programs, 
such as the United Kingdoms’s.212 According to O’Day and Stapleton, SSDI benefits are 
significantly more generous compared with UK incapacity benefits; moreover, SSDI’s stricter 
eligibility requirements suggest that SSDI beneficiaries are less likely to have some residual 
functional capacity to work relative to UK beneficiaries.213 Therefore, SSDI beneficiaries 
presumably have less incentive to return to work. Although mandatory counseling could improve 
the return-to-work rate of SSDI beneficiaries, the effect may be smaller compared with the impact 
of WFIs on UK beneficiary employment outcomes.  
Benefit Offset 
Another reason behind the low return-to-work rate stems from the fact that some beneficiaries 
deliberately “park” their earnings from work below the SGA threshold. After completing the TWP 
and 36-month Extended Period of Eligibility (EPE), beneficiaries must earn below SGA or risk 
having their benefits terminated.214 Consequently, some beneficiaries may intentionally keep their 
earnings below SGA in order to maintain receipt of SSDI benefits. One study found that between 
0.2% and 0.4% of all SSDI beneficiaries parked their earnings below SGA in a typical month 
from 2002 to 2006.215  
Beneficiaries may park their earnings below SGA (sometimes called the “cash cliff”), in part, 
because their impairment prevents them from returning to work on a consistent basis. Another 
study found that 59.0% of Ticket to Work participants returned to work at some point between 
2003 and 2005; however, of those participants who left work, the most cited reason was due to 
poor health.216 Parking earnings below SGA may weaken a work-oriented beneficiary’s 
attachment to the labor force, possibly resulting in an erosion of skills and thus a reduced 
likelihood of returning to work following a health-related withdrawal from the labor force.217 
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To remedy the phenomenon of parked earnings, some disability-rights organizations have 
advocated eliminating the fixed cash cliff (SGA threshold) and instead adopting a gradual benefit-
offset model that allows beneficiaries to increase their earnings while remaining on SSDI.218 The 
SSI program operates under a benefit-offset system, deducting $1 in benefits for every $2 in 
earned income above $65.219 Benefit offset has the potential to reduce the average duration of 
benefit receipt, by increasing the time spent off SSDI rolls for beneficiaries engaged in work. 
Hence, benefit offset could lower overall SSDI program costs, while increasing beneficiary 
earnings and attachment to the labor force.  
Benefit Offset National Demonstration 
SSA is currently in the process of conducting a Benefit Offset National Demonstration (BOND) 
project, during which treatment participants lose $1 in benefits for every $2 in earnings exceeding 
a BOND Yearly Amount (BYA) equal to 12 times the monthly SGA amount.220 BOND 
participants can also receive Enhanced Work Incentives Counseling (EWIC), which is designed 
address a range of issues related to returning to work, including access to medical treatment, 
employment services, and job training.221 In implementing BOND, SSA seeks to test whether 
benefit offset can increase earnings and reduce dependence on SSDI for work-oriented 
beneficiaries (i.e., beneficiaries with some, albeit limited, capacity to work).222 
In preparation for BOND, SSA implemented a four-state pilot program known as the Benefit 
Offset Pilot Demonstration (BOPD) from 2005 until the end of 2008.223 According to SSA, 
participation in BOPD had a positive effect on the earnings of individuals in the treatment group; 
however, BOPD also increased mean benefit payments due to partial payments made to 
beneficiaries whose benefits would have been suspended under normal program rules for earning 
above SGA.224 
In addition to increasing beneficiary earnings, BOND could conceivably increase the return-to-
work rate and therefore abate the growth in SSDI rolls. For example, beneficiaries with an above 
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average likelihood of recovery but whose impairment results in considerable employment 
instability would benefit from the BOND program through increased labor force attachment. 
Under BOND program rules, said beneficiaries could maximize their potential labor force 
participation while they recover from their impairment, thereby increasing their likelihood of one 
day permanently returning to work.  
Promote Supported-Work Policies 
Some researchers have suggested shifting the focus of SSDI reform away from reducing the 
current beneficiary population toward policies designed to attenuate the inflow of beneficiaries 
into the program.225 Advocates of this approach, sometimes referred to as “supported work,” 
argue that offering employment supports shortly after the onset of disability would allow more 
workers who experience disability to remain attached to the labor force and therefore less likely 
to apply for SSDI. Most supported-work policies use financial incentives to encourage employers 
to provide preventative, accommodative, rehabilitative, and other return-to-work services as a 
means of reducing employee enrollment in the SSDI program. Although Title I of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (ADA; P.L. 101-336, as amended) requires employers to provide some level 
of “reasonable accommodation” for employees with disabilities in the workplace, some 
employers fail to comply with the provisions of ADA, creating a barrier to employment for many 
workers with disabilities.226 Faced with few employment opportunities, individuals with 
disabilities who could conceivably work given appropriate accommodation may turn to SSDI as a 
last resort. This subsection provides an overview of two supported-work policies that have the 
potential to slow the incidence of benefit receipt and thus reduce the growth in disability rolls. 
Experience Rate the Employer’s Portion of the Payroll Tax 
Experience rating is a process for determining insurance premiums based on the cost of an 
insurance pool’s past claims. In essence, an insurer calculates a firm’s insurance premium based 
on the likelihood, or risk, of the firm submitting a future claim given its previous behavior. Many 
types of employer-sponsored insurance use experience rating to determine premiums, including 
state workers’ compensation (WC), unemployment insurance (UI), and private disability 
insurance (PDI).227 By making premiums a function of past claims, experience rating adjusts the 
firm’s costs to reflect its use of the insurance program. Consequently, experience rating creates 
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financial incentives for employers to prevent employees from needing specific insurance services 
in the first place.  
To reduce the incidence of SSDI receipt, researchers Richard V. Burkhauser, Mary C. Daly, and 
Philip R. de Jong have suggested that the federal government should implement some form of 
experience rating to the employer’s portion of the payroll tax used to fund SSDI and Medicare.228 
Currently, employers pay the same payroll tax rate on their employees’ earnings for SSDI, 
regardless of the rate at which their employees enroll in the program.229 Under the current system, 
employers have little incentive to make robust investments in preventative, accommodative, or 
rehabilitative services, because employees with disabilities can transition to SSDI without any 
additional cost to the employer. However, under an experience rated system, employers whose 
employees enroll in SSDI at rates above the national average would pay a higher payroll tax rate, 
whereas firms whose employees enter the program at below average rates would pay a lower 
payroll tax rate. In theory, the experienced-rated payroll tax should incentivize employers to 
provide supported-work services, in order to reduce their employees’ enrollment rate in SSDI and 
subsequently lower their labor costs.  
Supporters of experience rating often point to its implementation in the Netherland’s disability 
insurance (DI) system as evidence of its potential impact in the United States. Between 1998 and 
2003, the Netherlands gradually incorporated experience rating into its DI system, charging 
Dutch employers a differentiated premium rate based on their employees’ past enrollment in the 
DI system.230 According to one empirical study, the effect of instituting experience-rated DI 
premiums amounted to a 15% reduction in the enrollment of workers in the Dutch DI program.231 
Since the early 2000s, the Netherlands has witnessed a marked decline in its DI prevalence 
rate.232  
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Another potential advantage of the experience rating option is its relative simplicity. Employers 
already report payroll tax data to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), which the agency shares 
with SSA. Moreover, most employers are accustomed to the concept of experience rating 
stemming from their experience paying state WC and UI premiums. By compiling both payroll 
tax and beneficiary award data, SSA could conceivably initiate an experience rating system to the 
SSDI payroll tax “without imposing substantial new reporting requirements or administrative 
burdens on employers.”233 
Notwithstanding the potential for reduced enrollment in SSDI, implementing an experience rating 
system to the employer’s portion of the payroll tax may adversely affect some workers. For 
example, experience-rated payroll taxes could make employers hesitant to hire or retain workers 
“perceived to be a high risk for disability.”234 Employers may discriminate against older workers, 
people with chronic conditions such as diabetes, or individuals prone to at-risk behaviors (e.g., 
alcohol or substance abuse) in order to avoid paying a higher payroll tax rate on their employees’ 
earnings. To address this possibility, supporters of experience rating suggest implementing risk 
adjustments specific to factors such as age, occupation, and health status, as well as enforcing 
existing anti-discrimination laws.235 
In addition, experience rating could conceivably reduce the compensation or employment 
opportunities of low-wage workers. Some employers subject to higher payroll tax rates could 
shift the additional cost onto workers in the form of reduced take-home pay and benefits. 
Alternatively, employers unable to shift additional labor costs onto their employees may instead 
offset the higher payroll tax rate by hiring fewer workers in the future.236 Since many low-wage 
individuals typically tend to work in professions with high rates of disability, they may be 
disproportionately affected by employer cost avoidance and therefore more likely to suffer 
financially as a result.237 Opponents of experience rating argue that workers adversely affected by 
employer cost avoidance could turn to SSDI as a last resort, thereby increasing worker enrollment 
in the SSDI program.238  
Furthermore, some critics of experience rating have expressed concern that while the system 
changes the incentives of employers with respect to program enrollment, it fails to address the 
incentives of workers to apply for SSDI.239 Some workers may apply for SSDI because of 
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economic circumstances such as unemployment or low wages.240 Although the initial 
determination process screens out most non-meritorious claimants, SSA may grant awards to 
some claimants on the margin of program entry who could potentially work but choose not to due 
to economic circumstances. Under an experience rating system, the former employers of these 
new beneficiaries could have their payroll tax rate increased, even though the beneficiaries based 
their decision to apply for SSDI primarily on factors unrelated to health status or disability. As a 
result, said employers would be penalized twice for terminating a worker, insofar as their UI rate 
would increase, as well as their payroll tax rate for SSDI and Medicare. Given this scenario, 
opponents contend that experience rating the employer’s portion of the payroll tax does little to 
address the moral hazard of workers applying to the program for reasons unrelated to health 
status or disability.241  
Employer-Sponsored Private Disability Insurance 
Another policy option to stem the flow of beneficiaries into SSDI is for the federal government to 
promote employer-sponsored private disability insurance (PDI). PDI provides beneficiaries with a 
partial wage replacement, as well as workplace accommodation, rehabilitation, and other return-
to-work services. As of March 2012, 39% of all workers in private industry had access to short-
term disability insurance, whereas 33% of said workers had access to long-term PDI.242 Short-
term PDI typically lasts a fixed number of weeks or months, whereas long-term disability 
insurance can last anywhere from a year to FRA.243 Compared with other forms of employer-
sponsored insurance such as health-care, PDI is relatively inexpensive.244 In addition, employers 
can partially offset the cost of PDI by requiring employees to contribute to the plan.245  
Some researchers have advocated that the federal government should promote employer-
sponsored PDI to reduce the growth in SSDI rolls.246 Employer-sponsored PDI plans have the 
potential to reduce the incidence of SSDI benefit receipt, inasmuch as they provide employment-
support services soon after the onset of disability when the likelihood of recovery is highest. By 
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intervening with robust supported-work services early in the disability process, PDI may keep 
workers with disabilities attached to the labor force and therefore less likely to apply for SSDI.247  
The promotion of employer-sponsored PDI could come about in either one of two ways: (1) 
encouragement through incentives or (2) a government mandate. Under the former option, the 
federal government would offer employers financial incentives to provide PDI for their 
employees. For example, if the federal government adopted an experience rating system to the 
employer’s portion of the SSDI and Medicare payroll tax, SSA could further lower the payroll tax 
rate of employers who purchase PDI and whose insurance agents coordinate with SSA officials 
(gatekeepers) to manage disability cases in a cost-effective manner.248 Alternatively, the federal 
government could award subsidies or tax credits to firms that provide PDI.249  
Under the latter option, the federal government would require all employers to provide PDI for 
their employees. To enforce the mandate, employers who fail to provide PDI would likely face 
financial penalties for their non-compliance. In 2010, only New Jersey, New York, Hawaii, and 
Puerto Rico required employers to provide some form of short-term PDI—known as temporary 
disability insurance (TDI)—or contribute to a state-operated fund.250 Employer-mandated PDI, 
however, has become an increasingly popular approach to finance disability insurance in many 
European countries. The Netherlands, for example, now requires employers to cover the cost of 
sick pay for the first two years following the onset of a disabling condition, whereas the U.K. 
requires employers to pay up to six-months of statutory sick pay.251  
Researchers David H. Autor and Mark Duggan have proposed requiring all employers to provide 
medium-term PDI, through which workers with disabilities would receive rehabilitation services, 
workplace accommodation, and a partial wage replacement for two years.252 Plans under this 
proposal would be purchased on the existing PDI market, and employers would be permitted to 
require employees to contribute up to 40% of the cost of their coverage.253 Following the 
exhaustion of employer-sponsored PDI, SSA would transition beneficiaries who still lack the 
ability to engage in SGA onto SSDI. Workers with extremely severe or terminal disabilities would 
be exempt from the two-year PDI requirement and would instead be immediately fast-tracked 
onto SSDI.254 
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Each approach to promoting PDI has its strengths and weaknesses. The financial incentives 
approach is advantageous, to the extent that its implementation would be simple by comparison. 
The federal government already encourages employers to hire workers with disabilities by 
offering tax credits to offset any workplace accommodation that workers with disabilities may 
require.255 Therefore, expanding employer incentives to provide PDI via tax credits would entail 
minimal additional resources to institute. Although establishing SSA gatekeepers to work with 
employers and insurers under an experience rating system would likely require significantly more 
resources relative to the tax credit proposal, the net cost to the government could be limited, 
depending on the structure of the experience rating system.  
In spite of these advantages, the voluntary nature of the financial incentives approach may not 
induce enough employers to purchase PDI plans to have an appreciable impact on the incidence 
of SSDI receipt. As noted above, the federal government currently offers employers tax 
incentives to hire workers with disabilities; however, the evidence that such incentives actually 
drive employers to hire said workers has been “limited and inconclusive.”256 Similarly, the lure of 
a lower payroll tax rate under an experience-rating model may not cause employers to purchase 
PDI, especially if the cost of providing PDI outweighs the savings from the reduced payroll tax 
rate. 
On the other hand, the government mandate approach solves many of the inducement-related 
problems associated with voluntary financial incentives. After all, the prospect of having to pay 
financial penalties due to non-compliance is a more powerful incentive for employers relative to 
optional tax credits.257 A government mandate under this approach, however, does not necessarily 
guarantee universal compliance because employers could opt out of carrying PDI by simply 
paying the appropriate penalty. Nevertheless, the increased incentive for employers to provide 
PDI may have an appreciable effect on the inflow of beneficiaries into the SSDI program. 
However, it is difficult to discern whether a government mandate to require employers to provide 
PDI is economically feasible using the existing PDI market. Currently, most private disability 
insurers sell PDI plans as either short term (around 26 weeks) or long term (anywhere from a year 
to FRA). Although both types of PDI cost employers about the same amount per-hour worked, 
long-term disability (LTD) insurance plans typically have stricter eligibility standards. For 
instances, LTD plans may have more stringent definitions of disability or more expansive 
exclusionary criteria concerning pre-existing medical conditions compared with short-term 
disability (STD) insurance.  
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Private disability insurers often incorporate stricter eligibility standards into their LTD plans 
because such plans are inherently riskier. After all, a LTD beneficiary could potentially receive 
benefits for years or even decades. To offset some of the risk associated with LTD plans, insurers 
often require beneficiaries to apply for SSDI after the onset of disability. Insurers deduct any 
subsequent SSDI income from a beneficiary’s LTD benefit, thereby reducing their exposure to 
loss.  
Therefore, mandated medium-term PDI plans—as outlined in the Autor and Duggan proposal—
may not be financially viable in the current PDI market, to the extent that such plans do not 
permit insurers to offset part of their costs by requiring beneficiaries to apply for SSDI. While the 
increase in revenue stemming from more insurable workers may partially negate some of the 
increased risk of insuring people for disability over a longer period, it remains to be seen whether 
the PDI market can produce an economically feasible medium-term PDI plan. 
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Appendix. Acronyms 
AALJ Association of Administrative Law Judges 
ADA Americans with Disabilities Act 
ACA Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
AIP Adjudicatory Improvement Project 
ALJ Administrative Law Judge 
APE Aarts de Jong Wilms Goudriaan Public Economics 
AWI Average Wage Index 
BEA Bureau of Economic Analysis 
BLS Bureau of Labor Statistics 
BOND Benefit Offset National Demonstration 
BOPD Benefit Offset Pilot Demonstration 
BPAO Benefits Planning Assistance and Outreach Program 
BYA BOND Yearly Amount 
CBO Congressional Budget Office 
CDR Continuing Disability Review 
COLA Cost-of-Living Adjustment 
CPI-W Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical 
Workers 
CPI- U Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers 
CPS Current Population Survey 
CY Calendar Year 
DA&A Drug Addiction and Alcoholism 
DDS Disability Determination Service 
DI Disability Insurance 
DOT Dictionary of Occupational Titles 
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EITC Earned Income Tax Credit 
EN Employment Network 
EPE Extended Period of Eligibility 
EWIC Enhanced Work Incentives Counseling 
FICA Federal Insurance Contributions Act 
FRA Full Retirement Age 
FTC Failure to Cooperate 
FY Fiscal Year 
GAO Government Accountability Office 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
HI Hospital Insurance 
IRS Internal Revenue Service 
LTD Long-Term Disability  
NBER The National Bureau of Economic Research 
NCS National Compensation Survey 
NPRM Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
O*NET Occupational Information Network 
OASDI Old-Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance 
OASI Old-Age and Survivors Insurance 
OCAct Office of the Chief Actuary 
OIG Office of the Inspector General 
OIS Occupational Information System 
PABSS Protection and Advocacy for Beneficiaries of Social 
Security 
PDI Private Disability Insurance 
SECA Self-Employment Contributions Act 
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SGA Substantial Gainful Activity 
SMI Supplementary Medical Insurance 
SSA  Social Security Administration 
SSAB Social Security Advisory Board 
SSARP Social Security Administration’s Representation Project 
SSDI Social Security Disability Insurance 
SSI Supplemental Security Income 
STD Short-Term Disability  
SVRA State Vocational Rehabilitation Agency 
TDI Temporary Disability Insurance 
TWP Trial Work Period 
UI Unemployment Insurance 
U.K. United Kingdom 
VR Vocational Rehabilitation 
WC Workers’ Compensation 
WFI Work-Focused Interviews 
WIPA Work Incentives Planning and Assistance 
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